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CHAPTER - I 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
(A) HUME AND KANT 
The ancient and medieval philosophers conceived 
philosophy to be a superscientific enterprise. They deemed 
it to be the most fundamental of sciences, exploring deep 
and profound truths. The classical philosophers, despite 
their originality and depth of treatment were not 
specifically conscious of methodological questions 
pertaining to the validation of philosophical discourse. 
Consequently, their contributions in terms of numerous 
philosophical theories and systems sadly lacked in 
methodological clarity and, subsequently inspired great 
epistemological and methodological debates. 
While advancing various theories and systems of 
philosophy, the underlying assumption of ancient and 
medieval philosophers was that they could explore the 
nature and structure of natural, human and divine orders by 
advancing arguments or reasons. Such questions as origin 
and destiny of the universe, the status of man in cosmic 
scheme of things and the nature of ultimate reality or God 
could be definitively answered by advancing rational 
arguments. Human reasoning was invested with extra-ordinary 
powers. In fact, they thought that reason could prove their 
doctrinal thesis and correspondingly disprove the 
contentions launched by rival philosophers. For example, 
the medieval christian philosophers could forward the 
so-called cosmological, ontological, and teleological 
proofs in order to conclusively demonstrate the existence 
of God. The veridicality and certainty of external world 
was also sought to be established by means of arguments-^-
The proponents and followers of various religions put up 
strong theological defences of their respective beliefs and 
values. 
These philosophers were deeply speculative by their 
training and temprament and could not appreciate that any 
factual information could be attained only by sustained 
observations and rigorous experimentations. They were 
largely oblivious of the fact that their self-professedly 
metaphysical contentions were impossible of resolution by 
means of speculative arguments. However, in accordance with 
their own assumptions, the philosophers forwarded various 
theoretical statements which violated our widely held 
beliefs. For example, philosophers brought out such 
formulations as; 'Time is unreal', 'The external world 
depends upon perception', 'The phenomenal world is an 
imitation of the metaphysical world', 'Matter does not 
exist', etc. The philosophers who formulated such 
statements assumed that they were forwarding true 
information with regard to such categories as 'time', 
'world', 'Matter' etc. 
Throughout the long historical career of 
philosophy, it seems that there has been wide-spread 
methodological confusion. Philosophers were so busy in 
formulating various systems of philosophy that they had 
little time or inclination to pause and critically evaluate 
their suppositions and assumptions. For example, the 
classical rationalists assumed reason to be the unfailing 
source as well as the criterion of knowledge. Rati9nalists 
deemed reason to be a consistent and competent authority to 
validate and justify all knowledge - claims whatsoever. The 
cosmos itself was a rationally ordered scheme and reason : 
was capable of understanding the rationale of the cosmic 
order. In spite of a radical critique launched by classical 
skeptics and empiricists against the supposedly 
omnicompetent reason, rationalists continued to proliferate 
such theories as Idealism, Materialism, Monism, Pantheism, 
etc. for thousands of years. Pathagoras, Parmenides, 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Acquins, Anselm, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wollf, Hegel, etc. continued 
to formulate their doctrines in accordance with 
rationalistic assumptions. 
The rationalist assumptions were forcefully 
attacked by modern British empricists such as Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume. The Cartesian theory of innate powers of 
human reason was rejected by John Locke, who argued that 
our human mind is, to begin with, a 'tabularasa', i.e. 
clean state on which subsequent experience inscribes 
countless ideas. However it was 18th century Scottish 
Philosopher, David Hume, who launched a radical 
empiricistic attack on rationalistic presuppositions. 
Following Locke and Berkeley, Hume refutes to accepts the 
tentes of rationalistic philosophy. 
For Hume countless daily sense-impressions were the 
only source of knowledge available to man. However, sense-
impressions do give us only probable knowledge. They cannot 
disclose to us any knowledge pertaining to some material or 
spiritual substance. Hume did not accept the assumption 
that the so-called knowledge - claims supposedly arrived 
at through reason were necessary and universal, as ideas 
are, ultimately, traceable to sense-impressions and 
therefore devoid of any necessity. Hume's analysis of 
•Causality' and 'Induction' struck at the roots of 
rationalist epistemology, for Hume contended that sense-
experience gives us no warrant to accept the notion of a 
necessary causal connection or the validity of inductive 
generalizations. Experience presents us with particulars, 
that is, with separate and detached instances of sense-
impressions. Experience does not provide us any universal 
and necessary relation between say A and B. It may furnish 
us with numerous separate instances of 'A' attended by 'B'. 
It may even go so far as to offer us "invariable sequences" 
in each of which 'A' is followeld by 'B'. But each 
experience 'B' following 'A' is always something separate 
and distinct from the next. Sense-experience tells us "'A 
then B', 'A then B'", and so on. Due to habit/ says Hume, 
we insert between 'A' and 'B' fietitious necessary 
connection which we call "causal relation" - and conclude 
that "A causes B". But we do not find this necessary 
connection in experience. Experience gives us separate 
occurrence of "'This A is B", 'This A is B', 'This A is 
B'"/ etc. After a while we conclude that, "All 'A' is 'B'", 
and use this generalization to predict that future 'A's' 
will be 'B's*. But Hume tells us that although habit may 
often incline us to such general conclusions, yet we must 
admit that they are not given to us in our observation of 
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natural bodies. 
Thus by pushing Locke's and Berkeley's analysis of 
knowledge to extreme conclusions, Hume shows that we are 
incapable of arriving at universal causal connections or 
inductive generalisations by recourse to sense-experience 
which happens to be our source of knowledge. There are no 
good reasons to justify our beliefs in the existence of 
those universal and necessary connections to which we 
appeal to justify inductive and causal inferences. 
Inductive and causal beliefs have no rational 
justification. We hold them because inclinct, habit and 
custom strongly incline us to do so. Skepticism is 
unavoidable as all over epistemic beliefs are 
3 indefensible. 
The skepticism, advanced by David Hume was seen by 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant as striking at the very 
foundations of philosophy and science. Kant was convinced 
that knowledge was impossible of attainment without 
presupposing the validity of universal or general 
judgements; the judgements that are arrived at by recourse 
to inductive generalizations or causal inferences. In order 
to overcome Humean Skepticism, Kant felt we will have to 
demonstrate how those universal and necessary connections 
are rationally justifiable which according to Hume have no 
basis in sense-experience. Kant felt it was crucially 
important that philosophers of science establish the 
validity of synthetic a 'priori judgements'. The validity 
of analytic a priori judgements was possible by 
definitional analysis of subject and predicate terms, 
whereas synthetic a 'posteriori' judgements could be 
verified by means of observation and experimentation. 
However that does not solve our problem. The analytic a 
'priori' propositons are certain but not informative. The 
synthetic a 'posteriori' judgements are informative but not 
certain. We could refute Humean skepticism only if we can 
show some statements to be both certain as well as 
informative. Such statements have got to be synthetic a 
'priori'. Only if there are judgements that are 
simultaneously synthetic as well as a 'priori', can it be 
shown, Kant felt, that even if knowledge starts with sense-
experience, it does not originate totally from it. The 
sense-experience is a necessary but not a sufficient 
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condition of knowlege. 
Kant tried to respond to the above problem in the 
following manner : The universal and necessary quality of 
causal, inductive, and other judgements of a general nature 
is determined by the structure of mind itself. The mind is 
not a passive receipient of sense-impressions as held by 
British sensationalists. Our mind is dynamic and active and 
endowed with certain innate forms which organise and 
interpret our scattered sense-impressions. 
The data presented to us by sense-experience are 
first oriented in space and time. Space and time are not 
objectively existing phenomena independent of our 
consciousness. Space and time are forms of human mind. 
These forms impress themselves on all human experience, 
thus co-ordinating the data of experience in space and 
time. Furthermore, these sense-experiential data as 
oriented and co-ordinated in space and time, are 
categorised or classified through categories of our 
understanding. Human understanding possesses twelve innate 
forms or categories. The universality and necessary 
connectedness of our judgements are derived from our 
understanding. The raw material supplied by experience when 
categorised by the operations of our categories of 
understanding results into universal and necessary 
judgements. For example, experience provides us with such 
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individual instances as "X then y", "x then y" etc. 
Henceafter/ the category of causality interprets these data 
supplied by experience and consequently such universal 
judgements as 'x causes y' or 'Quinine cures malaria' are 
formulated. Other general or universal judgements too are, 
a function of other categories upon the data provided by 
experience. Now since percepts are ordered by concepts 
which owe their nature to the structure of the mind, all 
our knowledgle is unavoidably conditioned by our faculties 
of understanding. We cannot know what the external world is 
as it exists in - itself i.e. independently of human 
understanding. Things-in-themselves or noumena are 
unknowable. We can only know the appearances or phenomena 
revealed to us through the operation of the categories of 
understanding upon this unknowable world. Concepts formed 
without any basis in sense-experience are bereft of any 
reality. However, percepts without the ordering and 
interpreting role of concepts will be of no avail in 
advancing knowledge. 
Kantian account of human knowledge did not only 
clash with British phenomenalistic epistemology but had in 
store serious embarrasment for continental speculative 
rationalists as well. To the dismay of British empiricists 
Kant argued that categories of understanding are the 
presuppositions and preconditions of all empirical 
knowledge and thus the so-called logically consistent 
skeptical conclusions have precisely crept up because of 
Hume's insufficient grasp of the logic and dynamics of 
human understanding and to the utter frustration of 
continental rationalists Kant pointed out that employment 
of the a priori and pure categories of understanding 
independent of the data supplied by sense-experience is 
o 
illegitimate and results in antinomical formulations. 
The whole point of Kantian epistemology was to 
determine whether philosophers were justified in raising 
huge abstract and conceptual structures and whether it was 
9 
m any way fruitful to undertake such assignments. 
The philosophical enquiry of Kant quite clearly and 
unequivocally refuses to admit the validity of metaphysical 
claims pertaining to self, universe and God etc. The 
so-called metaphysical truths are what Kant terms as 
transcedental illusions. Such illusions have their roots in 
the essence of pure reason and so they crop up unavoidably. 
However/ it is one thing to recognise that reason , 
by virtue of its own logic, is unavoidably led to pose 
metaphysical questions and set forth their metaphysical 
answers, it is quite a different thing to investigate 
whether these questions are justified, i.e. whether there 
are assertions that are not only synthetic but also a 
priori, universally valid and necessarily true. The 
possibility of synthetic a priori propositions in 
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mathematics and physics; in the former due to space and 
time being the preconditions of all our cognition and 
in the latter because of the categories of understanding 
regulating our variable and contingent sense-experiences, 
misleads metaphysicians to profound synthetic a priori 
claims in metaphysics also. These claims being avowedly 
transphenomenal, are not susceptible to verification or 
falsification by any form of experience. 
Thus, while Kant offers a way out to justify our 
belief in the existence of objective and scientific 
knowledge of the world; his theory of knowledge or critical 
philosophy rejects the grounds for any universally 
acceptable, methodologically informed and objectively 
standardised metaphysical scheme delineating the 'reality' 
of God, Soul and the Universe etc. 
(B) THE NINTEENTH CENTURY SCENARIO : 
The ninteenth century was a period of economic, 
political and scientific progress. However during this 
century, there was wide-spread reaction against 
metaphysical system-building, thanks to Humean and Kantian 
epistemological investigations, triggered off, in their 
turn, by the ever-growing body of empirical scientific 
conclusions within the framework of the mechanistic world-
view outlined in the discovery of universal physical laws 
by Sir Issac Newton. 
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The post-Kantian critique of metaphysics in Europe 
was launched by different thinkers from diverse backgrounds 
and from various angles. August Comte (1797-1854) was the 
first advocate of the ideology of positivism. He postulated 
human cultural evolution to have passed through three main 
stages, viz; the theological, the metaphysical, and the 
positivistic. Regarding the theological stage as fictitions 
and metaphysical stage as abstract, Comte characterized the 
modern period as positive stage of human history. At this 
stage man outgrows his quest for ultimate causes and 
absolute explanation and instead confines himself to 
empirical research and experimental findings. Comte stood 
for scientific, methodological and empirical 
investigations. All metaphysical speculation regarding the 
nature of reality that radically goes beyond any possible 
events that could either support or refute such 
transcendent knowledge - claims, is to be avoided as 
fruitless and pointless quest for certainty. In this way, 
the positivistic, secular, antitheological and anti-
metaphysical views of Comte led to methodological 
interrogation of philosophy in twentieth century. 
J.S. Mill (1806-1873) was deeply interested in 
logical and epistemological issues in philosophy. In hie 
logic. Mill argued that the major premise of a syllogism is 
itself an inductive generalization and therefore a 
deductive conclusion therefrom is not a new piece of 
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information. A particular case is restored from a general 
proposition by means of a deductive inference. Induction is 
the only source of substentive general propositions a 
deductive inference discovers only the implication of 
verbal statements. However, the inductive procedure is 
concerned not so much with statements as with facts and it 
moves from an observation of particular facts to an 
understanding of general truth. Thus J.S. Mill kept alive 
the empiricist epistemological tradition of Britain and 
outspokenly argued against the possibility of a purely 
12 
rationalist account of knowledge. 
Darwin (1809-1882) gave a naturalistic account of the 
origin and development of the human life. The fundamental 
contention of Darwin is that different species are 
involveld in a stiff competition in their struggle for 
existence. In this struggle certain varieties of animals 
survive and multiply while some others perish. Darwin 
postulated that living species have to struggle against 
many disadvantageous conditions. In the course of the 
evolution, this struggle assumed a variety of forms. 
Species that are not capable of adopting to the 
circumstances in this way find themselves killed off, and 
those which succeed in adjusting themselves survive. The 
species of animals existent at present, have come to be 
what they are as a result of a long process of a 
development in the course of their structures have been 
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profoundly modified. They owe their being to the fact that 
they proved to be the fittest to survive in their struggle 
for existence. Man too has passed through the painful 
course of biological evolution, connpetition and survival. 
The struggle for existence has eventually sharpened man's 
wits and conferred certain physical advantages upon him 
which enabled him successfully to modify environment to his 
own advantage. 
This naturalistic explanation of life necessitated 
thorough revision of our -metaphysical and moral beliefs 
sanctified by religious world-views and other numerous 
theological interpretation. The Darwinian account of 
biological evolution led to serious re-examination of our 
metaphysical and religions ideas and concepts. 
For Karl Marx (1818-1883), history is a struggle 
between classes, and classes, are defined by the relation-
ships of their members to the productive system. History is 
nothing but an account of the struggle between masters and 
slaves, feudal lords and serfs, capitalists and 
proletarians. Every class, develops its own ideology in 
keeping with its interests and economic standing in the 
society. At any given period, the ruling ideas are the 
ideas of the class that happens to rule. The ideas of the 
ruling class as interpreted by the supportive 
intellectuals, are defenses of its privileged position in 
14 
society. Conversely/ the exploited class develops its own 
ideology. They want to ventilate their grievances through 
an alternative ideology which is always antithetical to the 
ruling philosophy. Subsequently, there is an all-out war 
between the ruling and ruled class in which ideas are 
weapons along with direct and violent action. Thus ideas 
can havte both a conservative as well as a revolutionary 
function. However, the Marxian analysis of ideas as being 
class-based and motivated by economic interests and 
considerations/ robbed metaphysics of much of its sheen as 
well as clan and Marxism become one of the foremost 
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antimetaphysical movements in ninteenth century. 
Ki-erKegaard (1813-1855) developed a powerful 
critique of all system metaphysics, pointing out that the 
concrete richness of life cannot be comprehended within as 
abstract conceptual system. He declared that the Hegelian 
attempt to systematise the whole of existence in a neat 
conceptual formulation was selfdefeating as existence is 
not an inert state but a changing process. Hegel attempts a 
harmonious dialectical conciliation of all contradictions. 
He resorts to imposing universal resolutions upon the 
unavoidable antinomies which characterise an authentic 
individual existence. 
The dilemma stem from the concrete situation of an 
individual's life. All abstract and conceptual models are 
as best possibilities. Only a willing, struggling and 
15 
striving individual can, by trying to realise any specific 
possibility/ confer any reality or existence upon it. What 
we dO/ depends upon our willing and not upon our 
understanding. 
The metaphysician's misplaced trust in the power of 
the rational argument drives him to establish an absolute 
and final system. All metaphysical systems are 
generalisations/ reductions and conceptual illusions. 
Philosophical theories and theological doctrines are not 
scientifically verifiable or logically demonstrable 
propositions. So, instead of devising abstract metaphysical 
systems/ Philosophy should address itself to the task of 
illuminating concrete individual existence. In so doing/ 
philosophy cannot achieve any universally acceptable system 
of ideas, but it can help an individual in arriving at that 
passionate inner commitment to something that is 
objectively uncertain but is the highest truth at personal 
level. 
In this way Kierkegaard questioned the very Locus 
standi andTrnodus operandi of classical and medieval mode of 
doing philosophy. The revival of Kierkegaards' approach by 
20th century German and French existentialists emerged as a 
strong protest against conventional metaphysics. 
Ernest Mach (1838-1916) was a philosopher of 
Science. He was interested in the clarification of the 
16 
logic of scientific conclusions. He was influenced by David 
Hume's epistemological analysis. Accepting Humean 
impressions as the basic elements or what he called 
sensations/ Mach' developed his version of empiricism known 
as sensationism. 
Mach maintains that our countless experiences of 
phenomena generates in us an urge to systematically 
understand them and to communicate them to others. In the 
process/ we are led to looking for connections and 
relations between various kinds of elements and trying to 
understands them not in isolation but in their total 
contextual background. Thus emerges the unitary conception 
of the world/ which serves as the basis of all scientific 
inquiry. All natural phenomena can be described, understood 
and communicated through observation. Sense-experience is 
the source of all scientific knowledge. Scientific 
knowledge cannot be a priori. It need not be demonstrated 
or proved. Verification via observation is the surest 
method of establishing scientific conclusions. 
It was a radical methodological departure worked 
out by Ernest Mach/ inspiring twentieth century logical 
positivists to launch a very powerful antimetaphysical 
17 
movement between two world wars. 
Besides these thinkers/ there were other ninteenth 
century philosophers such as Schonpennaur, Feurbach/ 
Herbert Spencer/ Whilliam James/ Nietzsche etc./ who 
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powerfuly and radically moulded our conception of 
philosophy from an all-pervading superscience to an 
open-ended methodological analysis of human situation, 
human existence and human languagle etc. The rise of human 
sciences such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, 
economics, political science, linguistics, etc., during 
nineenth century also led to increasing delimitation of the 
jurisdiction of philosophy and instigated philosophers to 
undertake a fresh methodological assessment of their 
ontological, cosmological and axiological propositions. The 
phenomenon of perennial philosophical disagreement also 
induced philosophers to understand the nature of 
philosophical arguments in the light of contemporary 
methodological imperatives. 
(C) THE ANALYTICAL TURN : 
The irresolvability of philosophical disagreements 
unavoidably persuaded philosophers to take a fresh look at 
the logic and methodology of philosophical discourse. The 
ever-increasing standardisation of natural sciences mainly 
achieved by experimental method and the adoption of 
scientific methodology by social sciences with a view to 
study social, political, economic, psychological and 
historical questions in 19th century also inspired 
philosophers to re-examine the very project of philosophy, 
especially that of metaphysical philosophy. Therefore, 
18 
Instead of spinning new philosophical theories, they 
engaged themselves in bringing out the nature of philosophy 
by determining the origin, genesis and function of 
philosophical discourse. 
The analytical approach to philosophy or the 
linguistic analysis of philosophical problems constitutes a 
very powerful critique of philosophy. It is a drastic 
revision of the superscientific pretensions of traditional 
philosophy. The pioneers of philosophical analysis were 
George Edward Moore and Bertrend Russell. They designed a 
trend of doing philosophy which, despite themselves, 
evolved into a radical thesis about philosophy and 
radically altered the very raisen de'tre. Locus standi and 
18 
modus operandi of philosophy in twentieth century. 
The analytical approach to philosophy tries to 
analyse the statements, arguments, proofs, theories, and 
systems worked out by various philosophers. It stands for 
deeper and fuller understanding of the role of various uses 
of language in the origin, genesis, and development of 
philosophical theories. Linguistic analysts are suspicious 
that there is something wrong at the very bottom of 
philosophical language. They allege that philosophers 
divest ordinary words of their conventional use. and 
superimpose upon them extraordinary philosophical uses and 
meanings. Therefore, the logic of philosophical language 
needs to be probed. 
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Analytical philosophers stress that the language of 
philosophical theories needs to be clarified with a view to 
resolve the perennial controversies going on in philosophy. 
The central contention of linguistic philosophers is that 
philosophical problems can be solved or dissolved either by 
reforming language or by understanding more about the 
language we use. The underlying assumption is that 
linguistic factors play crucial role in the formation and 
sustenance of philosophical disputes. In view of the same 
neither empirical research nor logical deduction help us in 
the resolution of philosophical problems. The only way to 
grasp the dynamics of philosophical disagreement is to 
carefully analyse the discourse employed by philosophers. 
Philosophical analysis is not interested in 
defending or rejecting any philosophical system-
philosophers work out various theories or systems. 
Philosophical analysis as such tries to be neutral, 
treating all theories with equidistance and detachment. The 
job of philosophical analysis is to bring out the merits 
and demerits of various philosophical theories in the light 
of accepted or acceptable methodological criteria. 
Philosophical analysts do not formulate substantive 
philosophical theories themselves. Rather they try to 
examine the meaning and function of such statements as 
constitute various philosophical theories. For example, a 
philosophical analyst will not formulate or expound such 
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philosophical statements as : "God is the ultimate ground 
of the universe", "The external physical world is Maya", 
"Atman is Brahman", etc. A philosophical analyst tries to 
explore the uses or meanings of multiple philosophical 
utterances or terms. His concern is to find out the logical 
status of various philosophical claims or statements. The 
following statements by Ludwig Wittgenstein examplify as 
to what analytical statements are in contradistinction to 
substantive philosophical judgements : 
A. "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into 
statements about their constituents and into 
propositions that describe complexes completely". (TLP-
2.0201) . 
B. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary 
propositions". (TLP-5(1)). 
C. "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". 
(TLP-5.6). 
D. "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the 
treatment of an illness". (PI, SECT 225). 
E. "Philosophy does not result in 'Philosophical proposi-
tions, but rather in the clarifications of 
propositions". (TLB-4.112(4)). 
F. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language". (PI, SECT-109). 
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The above statements are not of philosophy but 
about philosophy. They do not side with any philosophical 
theory. Rather they project a 'theory of philosophy', they 
are not philosophical statements but statements on 
philosophy. They are not theories about such philosophical 
concepts as 'Time', 'Matter', 'Reality', 'Truth', and 
'Beauty', etc; such as, "Time is unreal", "Matter does not 
exist", '"Beauty is objective", etc., respectively are.. 
They are remarks or observations on the nature of 
philosophical propositions or about philosophy itself. They 
constitute an analysis or evaluation of philosophical 
discourse. There aim is to bring out the nature of 
philosophical theories. They are not an addition to the 
philosophical theories advanced by classical, medieval and 
modern philosophers. In a word these statements are 
metaphilosophical rather than philosophical statements. 
Accordingly, the philosophical analysts do not ask 
such questions as : "What is Reality?", "What is the nature 
of the universe ?", "What is the knowledge ?", "What is 
truth ?", "What is Time ?", "What is Freedom ?", etc; 
rather they pose such fundamental methodological questions 
as : "What is the nature of Philosophy ?", "Are 
philosophical statements cognitive or non-cognitive, 
analytic or synthetic ?", "What is the meaning of a 
philosophical statement ?", "How are philosophical words 
used ?", "Can philosophy ever be as universal and objective 
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as Mathematics or Physics/ or, if not, what is the nature 
of philosophical disagreements ?", "What facture are 
resposible for the rise of philosophical disagreements and 
how can they be resolved", etc. 
In response to such methodological questions 
twentieth century philosophical analysts broadly agree that 
philosophical propositions are devoid of any descriptive 
truth-value. No data can be collected in support of a 
philosophical thesis. A philosophical contention is neither 
confirmed nor dis-confirmed by any standardised or agreed 
upon method. A philosophical controversy continues even 
when the contending parties do not aspect any new piece of 
information. A philosophical conflict is not amenable to 
either experimental verification or logico-mathematical 
deduction. A philosophical dispute seems to be inherently 
undecidable. No 'philosophical research' can be expected to 
settle a typical philosophical dispute. Philosophical 
problems are not open to proof or disproof. As they cannot 
be solved, Wittgenstein contends that they can be dissolved 
by understanding the structure and function of 
19 philosophical discourse. 
(D) TWENTIETH CENTURY ANALYSIS : 
Now we shall be summarising the crucial methodolo-
gical and metaphilosophical insights of George Edward 
Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Logical 
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Positivists. It will provide a brief historical overview 
to the philosophical analysis as carried out by Gilbert 
Ryle whose 'treatment of philosophical disagreements' is to 
be critically evaluated in this dissertation. 
(a) G.E. Moore ; 
The starting point of Moore's philosophical 
analysis is his sense of unease with certain philosophical 
propositions that violated commonsense. Moore felt there 
were certain metaphysical generalizations such as/ "Matter 
does not exist", "Time is unreal"/ etc. which violated our 
common-sense beliefs and convictions. He felt called upon 
to defend such common-sense beliefs as "All of us were born 
at certain points of time" and "all of us did possess 
philosophical bodies" etc. Therefore, philosophical 
utterances about 'Time being Unreal' or 'Matter being 
non-existent seemed to him to be very strange. Even 
philosophers in their non-philosophical moments could not 
agree with what they professed in their philosophical 
moods. Moore could never doubt the truth of the 
common-sense propositions. However he was not clear as to 
their proper and clear analysis. 
For Moore analysis consisted in making clear the 
meaning of a complex proposition by translating it into a 
simple statement. In such an analysis, the 'Analysandum' 
and 'Analysiens' must be exactly equivalent in meaning. The 
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Analysis should be clearer and simpler than the statements 
to be analysed. 
The simple statement was one that was further 
irreducible and whose meaning could be grasped only 
ostensively. However, despite his best efforts, Moore was 
never completely satisfied with his method of analysis, for 
in his effort to analyse complex statements he could not 
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always find simple but equivalent statements. 
(b) Bertrand Russell : 
Russell developed certain techniques of analysis, 
which revolutionised our way of doing philosophy. He did 
not question the traditional definition of philosophy as 
being the pursuit of truth. In fact, logical atomism as 
developed by him is itself being considered a metaphysical 
thesis. However, the very philosophy of logical atonism, 
eventually, developed into what may be called analytical 
approach to philosophy. 
For Russell, the world is an aggregation of complex 
facts. Analysis consists in reducing complex or compound 
facts into simple or atomic facts. The consideration of 
analysis of facts leads Russell to the analysis of 
propositions as the facts are expressed in propositions 
which in turn are composed of words. Now on the plane of 
language we have simple atomic propositions and on the 
level of what language talks about, the atoms are the 
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simple atomic facts, those expressible by atomic 
propositions. When atomic propositions are generalised and 
conjoined by logical connectives, we get compound or 
complex propositions. Corresponding to complex propositions 
there are no complex facts. While an atomic proposition 
corresponds to an atomic fact, a complex proposition does 
not. The truth or falsity of a complex proposition is 
entirely determined by the truth or falsity of atomic 
propositions compounding it. So complex propositions are, 
what Russell calls, truth-functions of atomic propositions. 
Whether they are true or false will be revealed to us when 
we analyse them into atomic propositions from which they 
are deducible. So the fundamental thesis of logical atomism 
is that language. must break down upon analysis, into 
ultimate elements that cannot be analysed into other 
propositions. The world must then be composed of facts that 
are ultimately simple. In this way, Russell thinks that the 
truth-functional character of ordinary discourse consisting 
of compound propositions can be made clear by recourse to 
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analysis. 
(c) Ludwig Wittgenstein : 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally described to have 
authored two revolutions in twentieth-century philosophy. 
The earlier Wittgenstein, following, Russell, was a through 
going logical atomist. His earlier work 'Tractatus-Logico 
Philosophicus' is a vigorous statement on logical attomism. 
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For Wittgenstein, the outside world is comprised of facts, 
and most of these facts about world are highly complex. 
These complex facts can be deduced from less complex facts 
which, in their turn, are deducible from still less complex 
facts and this process continues till we ultimately reach a 
point where the analysis of facts cannot be carried On, in 
view of the complete unanalysability of facts because of 
their simplicity. Such irreducible and unanalysable facts 
are, technically termed as ' atomic facts'. Corresponding 
to these atomic facts on the linguistic plane we have 
atomic statements or elementary propositions. These 
elementary propositions are themselves irreducible, 
photographically representing atomic facts. Thus, for 
earlier Wittgenstein, all complex propositions are the 
truth-functions of elementary propositions. The truth-
claims of complex propositions can be uncovered if we 
reduce them to elementary constituent propositions. A list 
of all elementary propositions, both true and false, would 
furnish us with every piece of knowledge that we need to 
know, as all complex propositions depend on elementary 
22 propositions for the determination of their truth-value . 
The central contention of later Wittgenstein is 
that words of a natural language are multifunctional and 
are used in a variety of ways. The traditional philosophers 
did not pay requisite attention to the multifunctional 
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character of words. Words have descriptive, evaluative, 
performative/ fictional, deductive, explanatory, 
exhortative, and interpretative uses. Philosophical 
problems are generated by confusing these diverse uses with 
one another. 
The confusion of multiple uses or functions of 
words is the main source of philosophical problems. 
Therefore the clarification of the logic of language is the 
most important technique of resolving philosophical 
disagreements. 
As a matter of fact, we play multiple language-
games in our daily intercourse. We give orders, report and 
event, formulate a hypothesis, make up a story, make a 
joke, guess riddles, thank, curse, greet, pray, etc. All 
these uses of language are perfectly legitimate in our 
daily interpersonal communication. However, in most of 
traditional philosophical discourse, philosophers have 
confused different uses of various words. For ifexample, 
most traditional philosophers have assimilated all 
declarative sentences to one paradigm use, namely, 'the 
descriptive one'. Thus a traditional philosopher will 
hardly differentiate between such sentences as : "The table 
is brown", "The garden is lovely", "Atman is Brahman", etc. 
although the first sentence is descriptive, the second one 
is evaluative and the third one is interpretative. As the 
mood of all the sentences is declarative, the traditional 
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philosophers will assume all the three sentences to be 
descriptive. The logic of the discourse is seldom 
differentiated from the grammar of the discourse in 
23 traditional philosophy. 
(d) Logical Positivism : 
Inspired by 18th century British Philosopher David 
Hume/ 19th century German Philosopher Ernest Mach and early 
20th century Austrian philosophical analyst and the author 
of 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'/ Ludwig Wittgenstein/ a 
group of veinnese philosophical analysts led by Schlick/ 
Carnap/ Hahn, Waismann, and Neurth developed a highly 
radical version of analytical approach to philosophy, widely 
known as 'logical positivism'. They were in complete 
agreement with earlier Wittgenstein that the job of 
philosophy is not to arrive at philosophical propositions 
but to clarify various propositions. 
Logical positivists. Ostensibly based their 
approach to philosophy on the logical analysis of the 
language. Such an analysis is important in order to 
determine the type of discourse to which philosophical 
statements belong. Logical positivists, to begin with, 
recognized two main functions of words; informative or 
cognitive and expressive or emotive. They deemed science to 
be made up of cognitive sentences which described states of 
affairs in the actual world, whereas/ poetry was said to be 
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comprisedof emotive statements whose function was to arouse 
similar emotions in us. 
Logical positivists maintained that utterances 
expressing attitudes, feelings, and emotions, comprise 
emotive discourse; whereas cognitive statements alone are 
meaningful since meaning is the relation between a 
linguistic symbol and objects symbolized in the outside 
world. Utterances expressing emotions have no cognitive 
meaning at all. The cognitive statements are further 
divided into synthetic factual statements and analytic 
logico-matheraatical statements. Synthetic statements are, 
in principle, observable and verifiable. Analytic 
statements are self-explanatory in so far as their 
predicate terms merely translate what the subject terms 
already contain. However, analytic statements are devoid of 
any factual content and are mere tautologies. As against 
them, the synthetic propositions are descriptive and 
informative. Most of scientific and commonsense statements 
are synthetic a posteriori statements and confirmable by 
recourse to observation or verification. In view of the 
same, logical positivsts stressed that before a statement 
is declared to be true or false, it must be meaningful or 
intelligible, in the sense that its possible mode of 
verification must be understood. The meaningfulness of 
factual statements is deemed to be identical with their 
mode of verification. Hence the dictum". The meaning of a 
proposition is the method of its verification. 
"If a statement lacks a method of verification, 
it lacks cognitive meaning, and is only a pseudo 
statement. If it has no cognitive meaning, it can 
be neither true nor false. It is meaningless or 
non-sense in the strict sense, even though it may 
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be correct grammatically". 
A.J. Ayer formulates the varifibility criterion of 
meaning in the following words : 
"The criterion which we use to test the 
genuinness of apparent statements of fact is the 
criterion of verifiability. We say that a 
sentence is factually significant to any given 
person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify 
the proposition which it purports to express, 
that is, he knows what observations would lead 
him under certain conditions, to accept the 
proposition as being true, or reject it as being 
false".^^ 
In the light of above criterion of meaningfulness 
of statements, the logical positivists asked the 
traditional philosophers to pinpoint the possible mode of 
verification of philosophical statements which they 
consider to be cognitively meaningful. If philosophical 
statements can not be subjected to any actual or possible 
mode of verification, they are meaningless and cannot be 
eccepted to be either true or false. As a matter of fact, 
philosophical statements have no possible mode of 
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verification/ they are only pseudo-statements/ although 
traditional philosophers might deem them to be not only 
meaningful but also true. 
Logical positivists maintained that traditional 
philosophers have misunderstood the very role and function 
of philosophy. The job of philosophy is not to furnish us 
with a set of ontological, cosmological and axiological 
statements but to clarify the nature of different types of 
statements/ especially that of the statements of science. 
Philosophy is not a search for truth but a pursuit of 
meaning and clarity. The genuine task of philosophy is to 
clarify the meanings of basic concepts. It should not 
attempt to answer unanswerable questions such as those 
2 6 
regarding the nature 'Reality'. 
Gilbert Ryle along with Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Austin was one of the founding fathers of Linguistic 
analysis/ which by many accomplished practitioners of 
philosophy/ is considered to be the foremost philosophical 
breakthrough of twentieth century/ and which set the style 
of method of doing philosophy in the entire English 
speaking world in our times. 
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CHAPTER - II 
HOW GILBERT RYLE SEES' PHILOSOPHY 
Gilbert Ryle like Ludwig-Wittgenstein was a product 
of positivistic philosophical Melieu inspired and sustained 
by the ongoing march of experimental sciences. In his 
earlier philosophical phase, Wittgenstein was deeply 
inspired by Austraian and German positivism. This 
positivistic phase of Wittgenstein crystallised into one of 
the classics of twentieth-century philosophy/ viz 
"Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus", although/ in his second 
philosophical phase Wittgenstein repudiated some 
foundational thesis of his positivistic approach. 
Gilbert Ryle/ on the other hand/ realised the 
positivistic challenge to philosophy in so far as it tried 
to get us rid of all philosophy and instead replace it with 
science. Although Ryle was in agreement with the central 
contention of the positivistic critique of philosophy/ yet 
he tried to delineate what he still considered to be the 
unique task of philosophy. 
Ryle is in agreement with the main thrust of 
contemporary philosophical analysis in rejecting the super-
scientific conception of philosophy. Ryle did not view 
philosophy to be one of the sciences or "the systematic 
study of ultimate Reality". Philosophy like Mathematical 
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and logical sciences cannot arrive at its results by 
recourse to deductive method, nor can it, like natural 
sciences, discover laws by the technique of inductive 
generalization or experimental verification. The 
traditional argumentative way of doing philosophy could not 
arrive at any universally agreed upon or acceptable 
conclusions. Therefore, the traditional way of doing 
philosophy needs to be replaced by a new role for 
philosophy. 
Accordingly, Ryle viewed philosophy as the activity 
of laying bare the logical categories which underlie and 
are often distorted by the surface grammar of our ordinary 
speech. 
For Ryle, like Wittgenstein, philosophy was 
analysis of ordinary language so as to rectify its 
mishandlings. Ryle views philosophy as a method of revising 
misuses of ordinary language and, thereby revising 
doctrines that were, to begin with, derived incorrectly 
from the surface structure or logic of language. He thinks 
that philosophy is born out of the surface meanings of 
ordinary language. What is important is that we get past 
the surface grammar or surface logical structure of 
ordinary language, and its apparent meaning. The job of 
philosophical analysis is to uncover the fundamental 
grammar or true logical form of day to day language. 
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Thus it is clear that Ryle was deeply inspired and 
activated to conduct and carry on philosophical analysis by 
Russells' theory of Descriptions. The following extracts 
from Wittgenstein's 'Logico-Tractatus-Philosophicus' too 
indicate Ryles other sources of inspiration. 
"In philosophy there are no deductions/ it is 
purely descriptive. The word 'Philosophy' ought 
always to designate something over or under/ but 
not beside, the natural sciences. Philosophy 
gives no pictures of reality/ and can neither 
confirm nor confute scientific investigations... 
Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for 
philosophizing. Philosophy is the doctrine of the 
logical form of scientific propositions (not 
3 
primitive propositions only)". 
"Philosophy is not one of the natural 
sciences. (The word 'Philosophy' must mean 
something whose place is above or below the 
natural sciences/ not beside them). Philosophy 
aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an 
activity. A philosophical work consists 
essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not 
result in 'Philosophical propositions'/ but 
rather in the clarification of propositions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were/ 
cloudy and indistinct : its task is to make them 
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clear and to give them sharp boundaries". 
Like Wittgenstein Ryle would argue that the job of 
philosophy was not to formulate theories of reality. Rather 
35 
it was an activity or a method through which we clarify the 
logic and grammar of ordinary language. The function of 
philosophy was not to discover new empirical truths. Its 
modest mission was to re-arrange our language or analyse it 
in order to uncover its correct logical form or real 
meaning. Only in such a way can philosophy display to us 
the pseudo-referring expressions, category-mistakes and the 
incorrect use of various words, phrases and sentences. The 
business of philosophy is not to provide us information of 
facts but undertake clarification of language. 
"I have said that there is no philosophical 
information. Philosophers do not make known 
matters of fact which were unknown before. The 
sense in which they throw light is that they make 
clear what was unclear before, or make obvious 
things which were previously in a muddle. And the 
dawning of this desiderated obviousness occurs in 
the finding of a logically rigorous philosophical 
argument". 
There are passages in Ryle's 'collected papers' 
which bring out the impact of logical positivism on his 
philosophical analysis'. "The philosopher may, perhaps, 
begin by wondering about the categories constituting- the 
framework of single theory or discipline, but he cannot 
stop there. He must try to co-ordinate the categories of 
all theories and disciplines". 
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This reminds us of logical positivist's programme 
for a unified Science; for here philosophy is not seen 
merely as clarifying ordinary language propositions but as 
questioning and clarifying and then co-ordinating the 
underlying conceptual assumptions. 
Ryle stresses that philosophy is not a function of 
scientific induction and therefore it is not the business 
of philosophy to discover facts. He also underlines that 
philosophical arguments are not demonstration of the 
Euclidian types; namely/ deduction of theorms from axioms 
or postulates. Philosophy is free-from any axioms and it 
never takes its start from postulates. 
After David Hume and Immanual Kant who declared 
metaphysics to be impossible of formulation the question 
what is philosophy was again forcefully raised in twentieth 
century. After the appearance of Wittgenstein's classic 
"Logico-Tractatus-Philosophicus"/ Logical positivists took 
up for re-evaluation the question of the nature and 
function of philosophy and brought out most forcefully the 
need for re-defining our conception of philosophy. The 
Central contention of logical positivists was that the 
empirical statements of natural sciences were standard 
forms of meaningful statements/ as only their truth or 
falsity could be tested by observation or experimentation. 
Besides empirical statements/ analytic statements such as 
"All trangles have three angles", "or 2+2 = 4", etc., could 
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be seen to be true or false merely by a consideration of 
the meanings of the words or symbols used in such 
statements. 
Ryle agreed with logical positivists that 
philosophical statements were neither empirical nor 
analytic/ and therefore their truth or falsity could 
neither be established by observation nor understood by 
a consideration of their subject and predicate terms. 
Ryle was deeply interested in the question "What is 
philosophy ?" He thought that philosophy could not be 
categorised as one of the many sciences. The questions of 
philosophy can not be settled in the way they do settle 
questions in natural and social-sciences. Metaphysics was 
not dealing with a set of problems with a clear-cut 
methodology of its own. Metaphysical statements were 
neither factual nor lexicographical. Nor could they be 
identified with mathematical or logical propositions. For 
Ryle it was one of the most fasinating questions to locate 
the clear-cut answers as to the nature and scope of 
philosophy. Ryle brings out the poignacy of his personal 
struggle in this regard/ in the following words : 
"There was in me, from quite early days, an 
ulterior concern. In the 1920's and the 1930's 
there was weling up the problem 'what/ if 
anything/ is philosophy ?' No longer could we 
pretend that philosophy differed from Physics/ 
Chemistry and biology by studying mental as 
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opposed to material phenomena. We could no 
longer boast or confess that we were unexperi-
mental psychologists. Hence we were beset by the 
temptation to look for non-mental non-material 
objects or objects which should be for 
philosophy what beetles and butterflies were for 
entomology. Platonic Forms, Propositions/ 
Intentional objects. Logical objects, perhaps, 
sometimes, even sense-Data were recruited to 
appease our professional hankerings to have 
subject matter of our own. 
I had learned, chiefly from the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, that no specifications of 
a proprietary subject matter could yield the 
right answer, or even the right sort of answer 
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to the original question 'What is Philosophy". 
In order to arrive at a conclusion, philosophers 
can, at best, employ the reductio-ad-absurdum argument. 
This argument is what Ryle calls the paradigm case of 
philosophical analysis. It consists in drawing out of 
conclusions or entailments from some statement of a theory 
to show that these conclusions are absurd. In such an 
argument, the philosopher might demonstrate that these 
conclusions are incomplete disagreement with those 
fundamental and established beliefs which are conclusively 
established and, consequently, held by all of us to be 
indisputable. It may also be shown that conclusions under 
consideration involve practical impossibilities like 
negotiation of an infinite series of steps. In this way the 
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absurdity of such conclusions may be demonstrated in order 
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to repudiate the initial theory. 
Philosophical statements or theories cannot be 
tested by observation or experimentation. They cannot be 
tested against the facts. Rather philosophy shows how 
statements or theories contain latent contradictions or 
entail infinite regresses in order to demonstrate their 
incompatibility with established beliefs. It is the central 
task of philosophy to take workaday propositions and even 
theoretical statements of various disciplines with a view 
to examine as to whether their real meaning or logical form 
is correctly understood. In this way/ Philosophy can 
attempt to minimise paradoxes or absurdities arising out of 
our mishandlings or misunderstandings of the propositions 
of various types. 
Thus Ryle maintains that there is no specific 
subject matter which is studied by philosophers/ just as 
entomologists study beetles and butterflies. Philosophers 
ask unusual questions about various ordinary things. These 
ordinary things can be either day to day speechs of common 
people or fundamental theoretical statements of various 
specialists. The unusual philosophical questions about such 
statements can be of such form as "what is the true logical 
form of the propositions they expressed ?" or "what are the 
logical powers of the concepts they make use of ?". 
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In view of the above stand taken by Ryle/ his view 
of philosophy came to be recognised as mapping of the 
logical geography of concepts. The philosopher must 
scrutinise a theory or concept and examine whether it leads 
to logically incompatible results or not. If the logical 
incompatibility is detected, the philosopher's task is to 
restore the true logical forms or propositions in question. 
Such a restoration or rehabilitation work can be undertaken 
only in comparison to theories and concepts already 
accepted and understood. 
The job of philosopher is to bring out the sources 
of paradoxes or absurdities by analysing various concepts. 
The concept may turn out to be internally contradictory or 
we may presume it to be having a logical form which it has 
not. It is a philosopher's responsibility to rehabilitate 
the concept and fit it in with other concepts which 
constitute its logical environment. 
The philosopher must take great caution not to be 
misled by grammar or the surface look of the words" and 
the manner of their arrangement in sentences or utterances. 
The concepts and propositions/ according to Ryle, carry 
with them no signal to indicate the logical types to which 
they belong. Expressions of the seune grammatical pattern 
are used to express multifarious thought. For example/ the 
word 'exists* does not have the same logical function in 
such statements as "There exists a cathedral in oxford" 
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and "There exists a square number between 9 and 25 I.e. 
16"/ for a number does not exist in the way a building 
does. 
Ryle thinks that the job of philosophy is to provide 
an account of the grammatical and logical features of 
various types of statements. However/ a philosopher cannot 
give new information about concepts employed in human 
discourse. Philosophical argument cannot increase our 
knowledge about various concepts. The philosopher can only 
rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we 
already possess. The non-philosophical people are not 
necessarily bothered to be instructed by philosophers as to 
how to apply various concepts in concrete situations. They 
already know that perfectly well. However/ they are not 
able to correlate these concepts with one another and with 
concepts of other sorts. As Ryle puts it : 
"Many people can talk sense with concepts but 
cannot talk sense about them; they know by 
practice how to operate with concepts/ any how 
inside familiar fields, but they cannot state 
the logical regulations governing their use. 
They are like people their way about their own 
parish/ but cannot construct or read a map/ of 
it/ much less a map of the region or continent 
in which their parish lies".-^ ""-
The job of philosophy is to determine the logical 
geography of concepts. By so doing a philosopher reveals 
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the logic of the propositions. They show with what other 
propositions they are consistent and inconsistent, what 
propositions follow from them and from what propositions 
they follow. Thus they bring out the logical type or 
category to which a concept belongs and also point out the 
set of ways in which it is logically legetimate to operate 
with it. 
"Thus/ we can say that philosophical 
statements are not the first order statements 
about specific entities constituting the 
furniture of the universe. They are rather 
second order statements about certain aspects of 
language. Philosophical statements* "are 
condemned to be un-informative about the world 
and yet able* in some important ways, to be 
clarificatory of those propositions that are 
informative about the world/ reporting no 
matters of fact/ yet correcting our mishandlings 
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of reported matters of facts". 
In this way Ryle thinks he has correctly and 
meaningfully responded to the Logical Positivists' loaded 
metaphilosophical question as to what is philosophy or what 
is the nature of philosophy. Ryle agrees with the central 
contention of positivists that philosophy is not one of the 
natural or social sciences. The apparently 'empirical'/ 'a 
posteriori' and 'synthetic' tone/ tenor, idiom and flavour 
of philosophical statements are misleading or misdirecting 
and the statements of philosophy do not fall into the 
category of verified or verifiable meaningful statements. 
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However/ for Ryle philosophical statements are not 
lexicographical or analytic statements either. 
Philosophical statements admittedly/ do not stem from 
observable data-base and are not derivable by valid rules 
of inference from axioms. Their origin can, however be 
traced/ by reference to the logical properties or logical 
implications of concepts and the propositions expressed in 
sentences. For instance/ for Ryle a paradigm philosophical 
statement would be of the form 'The sentence S is 
misleading in that its grammar suggests that the phrase x 
which is in S, is an expression of logical type LT when it 
is not'. An example/ illustrating this form might be the 
sentence "Jones' hates the thought of going to hospital". 
This sentence has the great misleading potential if it is 
not restored to its real logical form. The grammatical 
structure of the sentence under consideration suggests that 
the phrase "The thought of going to Hospital" is a 
referring expression as the proper noun "Smith" is a 
referring expression in the sentence "Jones hates Smith"/ 
when/ in point of fact/ it is not. Ryle suggests that the 
sentence "Jones hates the thought of going to Hospital" 
should be made to reveal its correct logical form by 
reformulating its real import in the sentence "^ Thenever 
Jones thinks of going to hospital he is distressed". The 
paradigm philosophical statements have the job of restoring 
the correct grammatical form of the sentences with a view 
to disclose their real logical form. Philosophical 
statements restore the correct logical categories or types 
of expressions used in the sentences. Philosophical 
statements do not pertain to the world but to the discourse 
being conducted about the world from various standpoints or 
angles. 
VI. Lyons summarises this position in the following 
words 
"Thus paradigm philosophical statements are 
ones which restate the grammatical form of 
sentences so as to reveal their true logical 
form (that is/ the correct logical categories or 
types of the expressions used in the sentences)/ 
and ones which display the ensuing arguments 
used to show that the grammatical form of a 
sentence is misleading. That iS/ paradigm 
philosophical statements are comments about the 
logical form of sentences and a priori arguments 
in support of them. Paradigm philosophical 
statements are not statements about the world/ 
but statements about statements about the world; 
or philosophy is talk about talk about the 
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world/ that is, a second-order enterprise". 
Nevertheless/ paradigm philosophical statements 
have also the task of describing the logic of concepts 
brought out in reformulated statements which give the 
correct logical form of original statements. Thus paradigm 
philosophical statements are not merely revelatory of 
misunderstanding about the logical form of propositions. 
Philosophy has a positive task to perform as well. One of 
45 
its crucial functions is to map the logical geography of 
concepts/ bring out their connection with other concepts, 
especially those concepts which are verified and 
indisputable. 
Thus Ryle may argue that just as an atomic physicist 
might say that his area of investigation was the 
micro-world of atomic particles and their relations which 
underlie the surface of the macro-physical world; 
similarly, a philosopher can argue that what he was dealing 
with were the concepts and propositions and the relations 
between them which underlie the surface grammar of our 
sentences and utterances. Sentences, meaning components, 
propositions and concepts were to philosophy what beetles 
and butterflies were to entomologists. Thus philosophers 
have a distinct area or subject matter for carrying out 
their philosophical investigations and explorations. The 
distinctive role of philosophy is to correct the 
mishandling of ordinary language which can be traced 
to misunderstandings of their logical features. 
Mishandlings of ordinary language led people to populate 
the world with entities which did not exist. The specific 
and special task of philosophy is to rectify 
misunderstandings leading to mishandlings of ordinary 
language culminating into incorrect ontological, 
cosmological and axiological beliefs. 
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This Rylean view of philosophy coincides with 
Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of philosophy. For 
Wittgenstein, philosophy arises out of the bewitchment of 
our intelligence by means of language and, accordingly/ the 
job of philosophical analysis is to untie the knots in our 
thinking by recourse to the technique of linguistic 
analysis. Thus Ryle along with Wittgenstein determined the 
agenda for philosophy in twentieth-century English speaking 
world. Ryle and Wittgenstein, exhorted us not to take 
ordinary language at its surface value. It is better to 
negotiate it carefully, or otherwise the logical and 
ontological howlers inherent in ordinary language will 
engage or entice us into pointless philosophical problems 
and disagreements. 
Gilbert Ryle is not generally deemed to be 
contributing to the therapeutic view of philosophy 
supposedly espoused by later Wittgenstein. However the 
following words from Ryle, seem to indicate that 
philosophical analysis has a therapetic function as well : 
"Philosophy is the replacement of category -
habits by category-disciplines, and if 
persuasions of conciliatory kinds ease the-
pains of relinguishing inveterate intellectual 
habits, they do not indeed reinforce the 
rigorous arguments, but they do weaken 
resistances to them. 
Some readers may think that my tone of 
voice in this book is excessively polemical. 
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It may comfort them to know that the 
assumptions against which I exhibit most heat 
are assumptions of which I myself have been a 
victim. Primarily I am trying to get some 
disorders out of my own system. Only 
secondarily do I hope to help other theorists 
to recognise our malady and to benefit from my 
,. . „ 14 
medicine . 
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CHAPTER - III 
GILBERT RYLE'S TREATMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT 
I. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM : 
The increasing methodological sophistication in 
twentieth-century has brought out the logic of various 
types of disagreements; scientific, mathematical/ 
historical/ legal etc. Philosophical problems and 
disagreements too have received deep and wide 
methodological treatment. The logic of philosophical 
disagreements is complex and like Wittgenstein, Wisdom/ and 
LazerowitS/ Gilbert Ryle has also tried to bring out the 
nature of philosophical disagreements. Ryle thinks that 
philosophical problems are more like dilemmas than the 
normal disputes that arise in day to day life. That is why 
philosophical disagreements can neither be proved nor 
disproved, confirmed nor disconfirmed. The two sides of 
philosophical disputes are equally justifiable or 
defensible. Anyone who considers a particular philosophical 
disagreement is caught on the horn's of a dilemma. Opting 
for any side of a philosophical disagreement entails the 
rejection of the other side and yet a person caught on the 
horn's of a philosophical dilemma is convinced that both 
sides of the dispute are equally cognent and coherent and 
equally debatable and justifiable. 
"In disputes of this kind/ we often find one 
and the same thinker-very likely oneself-
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strongly inclined to champion both sides and 
yet, at the very sametime, strongly inclined 
entirely to repudiate one of them just because 
he is strongly inclined to support the other. He 
is both well satisfied with the logical 
credentials of each of the two points of view, 
and sure that one of them must be totally wrong 
if the other is even largely right. The internal 
administration of each seems to be impeccable 
but their diplomatic relations with one another 
seem to be internecine". 
In any philosophical disagreement we are caught on 
the horns of a dilemma. We seem to have compelling reasons 
for both sides of a philosophical dispute. Thus we come to 
realise that philosophical disagreements are inherently 
undecidable. Ryle brings out this feature of undecidability 
of philosophical disagreements or puzzles in these 
characteristic lines : 
"On Mondays/ Wednesdays and Fridays he is 
sure that the will is free; On Tuesdays, 
Thursdays and Saturdays he is sure that causal 
explanations of actions can be found or are 
actually already known. Even if he does his best 
to forswears one view in favour of the other, 
his professions of conviction give forth a loud 
because of hollow sound. In his heart he would 
prefer saying that he knows that both views are 
true to saying that he knows that action have 
no causal explanations or that he knows that 
2 
people are never to blame for what they do". 
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A philosophical dilemma can arise in our day to day 
life. For example all of us know that a child needs to be 
properly educated with a view to display normal behaviour 
when he grows up. If the child is adequately groomed/ he is 
most likely to observe proper manners during his adulthood. 
When a person displays bad-conduct/ we think that he is 
badly brought-up. Then it seems to follow that his parents 
and not the person should be blamed for his various acts of 
ommission and commission. From this follows that his 
grand-parents and great grand-parents should be really 
blamed/ till we reach a point where none can be blamed at 
all. When we consider the duties of the parents we think 
that if they do not properly educate their son/ they must 
be deemed to be blame-worthy. On the other hand/ while 
considering the behaviour of their son/ we feel sure that 
he rather than his parents deserve to be blamed. One 
position seems to rule out our answer to the other and 
vice-versa. 
"We feel quite sure both that a person can 
be made moral and that he canot be made moral / 
and yet that both cannot be true". 
In a philosophical dilemma no new reasons are 
awaited to be discovered or arguments to be designed. The 
disputants may have all reasons and arguments wanted for. 
Ryle considers that philosophical disputes cannot be 
settled by any additional evidence to be supplied by 
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further scientific researches. Such disputes can be settled 
by carrying out an intensive analysis of philosophical 
discourse. Two sides of a philosophical dispute are not 
rival theoretical positions but plaintiff and defendant 
claims needing arbitration by appropriate analysis. 
Philosophical disputes may be likened more to litigations 
rather than to any substantial theoretical competitions. 
"Sometimes thinkers are at loggerheads with 
one another, not because their propositions do 
conflict/ but because their authors fancy that 
they conflict. They suppose themselves to be 
giving, at least by indirect implication, rival 
answers to the same questions, when this is not 
really the case. They are then talking at 
cross-purposes with one another. It can be 
convenient to characterize these cross-purposes 
by saying that the two sides are, at certain 
points, hinging their arguments upon concepts 
of different categories, though they suppose 
themselves to be hinging them upon different 
concepts of the same category, or vice-versa. 
But it is not more than convenient. It still 
remains to be shown that the discrepancies are 
discrepancies of this general kind, and this 
can be done only by showing in detail how the 
metiers in ratiocination of the concepts under 
pressure are more dissimilar from one another 
or less dissimilar from one another than the 
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contestants had unwittingly supposed". 
Gilbert Ryle maintains that there arise several 
types of disagreements in theoretical research. Often there 
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arise competing solutions in the face of problems. In fact 
multiple theoretical choices are offered in response to a 
given difficulty. Normally, it so happens that one of the 
competing solutions is true and others are declared to be 
false. However, if the question under consideration is 
fairly complex, we cannot easily choose among a variety of 
proffered solutions. In such cases, various theoretical 
responses may be partly right, partly wrong and partly 
incomplete. However such disagreements do not or should not 
bother us. We do not get disturbed in view of the fact that 
all the competing responses have contributed in finally 
arriving at a conclusively clinched solution of the 
problem. 
According to Ryle the disagreements that arise in 
philosophy are not settled in the above manner. The pattern 
of philosophical disagreements is a different one. 
Philosophical disagreements may be said to be dilemmas 
which seem to be irreconcilable with one another. A 
philosopher who advocates one of the proffered 
philosophical responses seems to be logically committed to 
rejecting the other. Such disagreements or dilemmas cannot 
be definitively clinched this way or that way. We feel 
there are strong reasons for advocating both sides of a 
philosophical dispute. Sometimes we would like to reject 
one and accept the other side of the dispute and 
vice-versa. Both sides seem to be having equal logical 
justification. 
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"In disputes of this kind/ we often find 
one and the same thinker, very likely oneself, 
strongly inclined to champion both sides and yet, 
at the very same time, strongly inclined 
Entirely to repudiate one of them just because 
he is strongly inclined to support the other. He is 
both well satisfied with the logical credentials 
of each of the two point of view, and sure that 
one of them must be totally wrong if the other 
is even largely right". 
Philosophical disputes are mostly carried on in the 
minds of philosophers. It is not necessary to discuss or 
debate a philosophical issue with another philosopher or a 
group of philosophers. We need not convene a Seminar or a 
Conference on a particular philosophical dilemma. The 
philosopher is mostly engaged in a philosophical dispute 
arguing for and against both sides of the dilemma. We may 
say that he is simultaneously the counsel for the 
prosecution, counsel for the defense and he has himself to 
deliver the judgement. The entire burden of proof on both 
sides lies on his own person, only he does not come up with 
a proof, this way or that way. The philosopher feels 
equally strong ties of allegiance to both of the seemingly 
discrepant positions. 
Rival solutions of philosophical problems are 
continuously in need of new arguments and fresh reasons, 
for all arguments or reasons cannot be completely submitted 
at any particular point of time. Besides, if the reasons 
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for one rival solution have same persuading power, it seems 
that all the reasons for the rival solutions have not been 
completely catalogued. Philosophers are psychologically 
attuend to finding additional reasons and arguments for or 
against the various solutions under consideration. Ryle 
says that it may so happen that we have all the reasons 
that can be cited in supporting or opposing a particular 
solution and yet we may not be able to decide as to which 
solution to finally adopt. It may be because philosophical 
disagreement cannot be settled by recourse to finding 
additional arguments and reasons for or against various 
positions. We may need to re-understand the logic of the 
settlement of philosophical disagreements. In fact a new 
view of philosophy and a new way of doing philosophy is 
needed. 
II. MIND BODY PROBLEM : 
Ryle tries to resolve philosophical disagreements by 
the method of linguistic analysis. His method is 
specifically to figure out the logical geography of the 
concepts and expressions used by philosophers. Such a 
linguistic and conceptual analysis will reveal that 
philosophical disagreements are born out of committing 
category-mistakes. 
Take, for example, the question of Mind-Body 
relationship or what is commonly called Mind-Body problem. 
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We may start with Rene Descartes / for he is famous for 
dealing with this so-called problem and making it one of 
the central debates of modern philosophy. 
According to Descartes there are two kinds of 
substances in the universe - Mental things and physical 
things - they are radically different from each other. Mind 
is pure consciousness while body is pure extension. But as 
it happens/ human beings seem to be both mind and body. 
Descartes argues that I am a conscious/ thinking being and 
my immediate experience tells me that I am a mind- As a 
conscious substance I just cannot afford to doubt my 
existence. However/ as I percieve/ I have a body which 
belongs to the physical realm. This sets the problem for 
Descartes as to how these two fundamentally and totally 
different kinds of being can co-exist to form the unity 
which is myself ? As a matter of fact/ my mind and body do 
interact. But how can one kind of being affect the other 
which seems completely different. Descartes answer to this 
question was too simplistic to be acceptable to subsequent 
philosophers. He thought that Mind and Body affected each 
other through the medium of what he called animal spirits. 
He also believed that the pineal gland in the brain served 
as a locus of exchange of influence between mental and 
physical events. The subsequent philosophers took sides in 
this highly seminal philosophical disagreement. Those who 
underscored the role of mind and played down the physical 
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side of human personality were led to adopt modern 
idealism. Other's who stressed the significance of matter 
or physical things and tried to explain life/ 
consciousness/ and mind/ as functions of physical events 
were led to adopt modern materialism. After Descartes/ such 
eminent philosophers as Spinoza/ Leibnitz/ Locke/ Berkeley/ 
Hume/ Kant etc./ gave their own versions of the mind-body 
problem. 
One of the most significant and influential books 
applying the method of 'Linguistic Analysis'/ while taking 
up the age-long Mind-Body philosophical disagreement/ is 
Gilbert Ryle's 'Concept of Mind'. The book appeared in Mid 
20th century i.e. 1949. The doctrine of Mind-Body dualism 
is outrightly denied and forcefully repudiated by Ryle. 
However/ he does not/ thereby accept/ the contention of the 
materialists that mental events can be reduced to or 
explained into physical events. 
The questions pertaining to the Mind-Body 
relationship started in view of the Cartesian dualistic 
account of Mind-Body problem. The Cartesian thesis assumes 
two totally different existences/ viz. mental and physical. 
The underlying supposition is that every human being is 
made in two parts; firstly/ he has' a publicly observable/ 
and spatially located material body and secondly he has an 
immaterial/ spatially unlocated and publicly unobservable 
mind since it is utterly private to each person. It is 
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assumed that every physical self must necessrlly be 
conjoined to a mental self in order to provide a coherent 
or acceptable account of human personality. Each one of us 
is deemed to be carrying about with us a second self that 
is invisible, nonpublic or mental besides or alongside our 
physical persons. The following quotation from Ryle 
summarises the Cartesian thesis. 
"The official doctrine, which hails chiefly 
from Descartes, is something like this. With the 
doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in 
arms every human being has both a body and a 
mind. Some would prefer to say that every human 
being is both a body and a mind. His body and 
his mind are ordinarily harnessed together but 
after the death of the body his mind may 
continue to exist and function. Human bodies are 
in space and are subject: to the mechanical laws 
which govern all other bodies in space. Bodily 
processes and states can be inspected by 
external observers. So a man's bodily life is as 
much a public affair as are the lives of animals 
and reptiles and even as the careers of trees, 
crystals and planets". 
But minds are not in space, nor are their operations 
subject to mechanical laws. The workings of one mind are 
not witnessable by other observers; its career is private. 
Only I can take direct cognisance of the states and 
processes of my own mind. 
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"A person therefore lives through two : 
Collateral histories/ one consisting of what 
happens in and to his body, the other consisting 
of what happens in to his mind. The first is 
public/ the second private. The events in the 
first history are events in the physical world/ 
those in the second are events in the mental 
world".^ 
In fact/ besides Descartes, the majority of 
classical, medieval and modern philosophers have shared one 
common assumption, namely, the bifurcation of man into two 
worlds, the physical and the mental, the body belonging to 
external physical world and mind belonging to internal 
world. To begin with the intention of bifurcation might 
have been purely metaphorical. However, the question as to 
how mind and body influence one another, has generated 
inseparable difficulties in philosophical circles. 
Philosophers have asked such questions as to how physical 
sources of stimuli can generate responses inside one's mind 
or how 'decisions framed inside his cranium can set going 
movements of his extremities'. 
"what the mind wills, the legs, arms and the 
tongue execute; what affects the ear and the eye 
has something to do with what mind perceives; 
grimaces and smiles betray the mind's moods and 
bodily castigations lead, it is hoped, to moral 
improvement. But the actual transactions between 
the episodes of the private history and those of 
the public history remain mysterious, since by 
definition they can belong to neither series. 
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They could not be reported among the happenings 
described in a person's autobiography of his 
inner life, but nor could they be reported among 
those described in some one else's biography of 
that person's overt career. They can be 
inspected neither by introspection nor by 
laboratory experiment. They are theoretical 
shuttlecocks which are forever being bandied 
from the physiologist back to the psychologist 
and from the psychologist back to the 
g 
physiologist". 
Underlying the bifurcation of a person's two lives 
is a philosophical assumption. Existence itself is assumed 
to be of two types; physical and mental. Physical existence 
is necessarily spatial and temporal/ whereas mental 
existence is necessarily temporal and non-spatial. 
Similarly whereas physical existence is composed of matter 
or is a function of matter, mental existence is a function 
of consciousness. 
Thus mind and matter are deemed to be diametrically 
opposite to each other or it is supposed that mind and 
matter are in a polar opposition. Thus material objects are 
out in space and mechanically connected with one another. 
On the other hand, it is supposed that mental occurrences 
happen in isolated fields, known as minds. It is further 
supposed that there is no connection between the happenings 
in various minds. Everyone of us lives the life of a 
Ghostly Robinson Crusoe. 
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While the minds of others cannot be known/ we are 
specially privileged, via introspection/ to understand the 
functioning of our own minds. V7e are so clear about 
knowledge of our own minds that there can be no doubt about 
it. Such knowledge can never be confused or we can never 
entertain doubts about it. One has a privileged access to 
one's own stream of consciousness. This stream of 
consciousness is made up of occurrences which are labelled 
as 'knowing' or 'believing' or 'hoping' or 'dreading' or 
'intending' etc. Ryle describes this whole dualist account 
or the mind plus body view of human persons as 'The dogma 
of the Ghost in the Machine'. 
"Mental states and processes (or are 
normally) conscious states and processes/ and 
the consciousness which irradiates them can 
engender no illusions and leaves the door open 
for no doubts. A person's present thinkings, 
feelings and willings/ his perceivings, 
rememberings and imaginings are intrinsically 
phosphorescent'; their existence and their 
nature are inevitably betrayed to their owner. 
The inner life is a stream of consciousness of 
such a sort that it would be absurd to suggest 
that the mind whose life is that stream might be 
9 
unaware of what is passing down it". 
Ryle contends that this official doctrine of 
Mind-Body dualism is absurd and entirely false. It is not 
false in detail but in principle. 
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"It is not merely an asemblage of particular 
mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of 
a special kind. It is/ namely, a category 
mistake. It represents the facts of mental life 
as if they belonged to one logical type or 
category (or range of types or categories), when 
they actually belong to another. The dogma is 
therefore a philosopher's myth". 
This myth has to be destroyed; the 'official', or 
Cartesian myth that mental-conduct expressions refer to a 
queer sort of entity, 'mind' and 'soul', distinguishable 
from the body in virtue of being private, non-spatial, 
knowable only by introspection. 
The dogma of the Ghost in the machine is a mistake 
of a special kind. It is a category-mistake. It represents 
the facts of mental life as if they belong to one logical 
type or category, when they actually belong to another. 
The Cartesian dualist dogma needs to be demolished 
by showing that it is one large category-mistake. A 
category-mistake is committed when, in seeking to give an 
account of some concept, one says that it is of one logical 
type or category when in fact it is of another. The logical 
type or category to which a concept belongs is the set of 
ways in which it is logically legitimate to operate with 
if . 
For example one commits the category-mistake if one 
says, "My Consciousness is purple", for consciousness is 
not the sort of thing which can be pruple. Only physically 
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visible objects can be classified as coloured. How we 
commit a category mistake can be shown by reference to the 
celebrated examples given by Gilbert Ryle as follows : 
Suppose I were to be taken to visit a university. I 
am shown the buildings/ meet some Professors, see the 
students in the lecture rooms, inspect the offices and 
residence halls etc. Now suppose I were to say, "yes, I've 
seen the students, the teachers, the buildings, and all 
that, but when are you going to show me the university"? My 
question would be deemed to be silly, because it makes out 
that I think a university is a thing similar to but 
separate from a group of students, falculty, buildings and 
so on. The truth is that a university does not belong to 
the same type or order of things as buildings, teachers, or 
students. Nor is it something over and in addition to them. 
So too the belief that corresponding to my physical self 
there is a related, but private and invisible mind which I 
alone can know, involves a category-mistake. 
Similarly when a child witnesses the march-past of a 
division and asks after observing battalions, batteries, 
squadrons, etc., as to when the division would appear, he 
commits a category-mistake. In such a case the child would 
be assuming that a division is something over and above the 
units already seen. His mistake would be rectified by 
pointing out to him that in watching the battalions, 
batteries and squadrons marching past he had been watching 
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the division marching past "The march-part was not a parade 
of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was 
a parade of the battalions, batteries, squadrons of a 
di vision". •'••^  
The same category-mistake would be committed by a 
foreigner, who for the first time, while watching a game of 
cricket going on, learns the functions of bowling, batting, 
catching and fielding carried on by bowlers, batsmen and 
fielders suddendly asks as to who carries on the operation 
of 'Team-spirit'. It will have to be pointed out to him 
that 'Team-spirit' is not an operation carried out by any 
specific player. It is not a separate task, over and above 
the bowling, batting and fielding operations. It is the 
keenness with which all the players perform their specially 
assigned tasks. The logic of the 'Team-spirit' is 
diametrically opposite to the logic of bowling, batting and 
12 fielding. 
In 'The Concept of Mind' Gilbert Ryle tries to 
analyse the logical powers of 'Mental Concepts'. These 
concepts, Ryle points out, do not create any trouble in our 
day-to-day discourse while we engage in various forms of 
communication or transaction. Our puzzlement starts once we 
try to discover the category to which particular expression 
belongs. We are puzzled when we try to explore the logical 
powers of the propositions into which such expressions 
enter. Ryle suggests that such puzzlement can be overcome 
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only by mapping out the logical geography of mental 
concepts and understanding the limits of their application. "^  
Ryle says that philosophers usually assume that 
'acting intelligently' is synonymous with 'theorising' or 
discovering the truth. However< Ryle contends that 
theorising is one of the many functions of intelligent 
behaviour consists in 'knowing how' as against 'knowing 
that'. We 'know how' to play chess or to speak French or to 
build a house etc. which is very different from theorising 
about games or about language-speaking or about house-
building. The contention that any practice, in order to be 
meaningful, must be preceded by intelligent thinking is 
untenable for it can involve us in infinite regress. It can 
be pointed out that if there were any reason for supposing 
that intelligent chess-playing must be preceded by 
intelligent theorising about chess, there would be exactly 
as much reason for supposing that intelligent theorising 
must in its turn be preceded by intelligent theorising 
about theorising and so on ad infinitum. Besides 
reassigning the logical type or category to a concept to 
which it belongs, Ryle tries to figure out a positive 
account of mental-conduct concepts as well. In the process, 
he provides a dispositional account of mental behaviour. 
The category mistake of dogma of the ghost in the machine 
arises because mental behaviour is mostly explained in 
terms of occurrences or episodes or processes, when it 
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ought to have been explained in dispositional terms. Ryle 
hopes that such an account would go a long way in 
abolishing mind as a shadowy entity which initiates ghostly 
actions. 
Ryle tells us that a disposition is an ability, 
liability, tendency or proneness to act or react, or fail 
to act or react, in a certain way in certain circumstances. 
To say, for example, that an animal is a ruminant is to 
attribute a disposition to it, for it is to make a claim 
that the animal in question will chew its cud if and when 
it has any to chew. When we say that a person or thing has 
a disposition to act or react in a certain way if certain 
circumstances occurred, sentences embodying dispositional 
claims are, strictly speaking, always hypothetical in form. 
14 If circumstances C occur then X will do y. 
However, Ryle again warns us that a disposition 
should not be construed to be a special sort of entity. For 
example, if we say that glass has a disposition to break, 
such a proposition is a shorthand for a range of 
hypothetical propositions such as : "If you drop glass, or 
hit it with a stone, or try to bend it, it will break". To 
look for some entity described by disposition is to look 
for the impossible. Ryle opines that when we say that our 
behaviour is dispositional, it means that our conduct is 
15 
'Law-like' or that it follows a regular pattern. 
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The dispositional attribution should not be taken to 
be a reference to an occurrence or state of affairs. A 
disposition is rather a proneness. We cannot have 
dispositions in the way we do havle arms or legs. A 
disposition is a behaviour pattern. A pattern of behaviour 
is not possessed, it is displayed through numerous pieces 
of behaviour. To attribute dispositions to a person or a 
thing is to make some law-like generalisations or 
hypotheses about that person or thing. Attributing 
dispositions is making inferences about the likely 
behaviour patterns and reactions of people or animals or 
things in a certain set of circumstances obtaining in 
future. These inferences or projections are based on our 
observations as to in what circumstances and with what 
constancy such behaviour - patterns or reactions have been 
noticed in the past. 
Similarly/ Ryle argues that so-called 'acts of 
volition' are not 'mental processes'. It is pointless to 
investigate as to whether volitions are continuous or 
interrupted. When volitions begin and when they end and 
whether they can be speeded up or slowed down are questions 
that do not mean anything and have therefore no answers. It 
is not the case that voluntary behaviour is preceded and 
involuntary behaviour is not preceded by an act of 
volition. 
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In the same way/ seeing and recalling are not 
'mental processes'. There are no 'mental processes' 
properly describable as 'acts of seeing' or 'acts of 
recalling'. Ryle recommends that 'seeing' and 'recalling' 
are not 'process' words they are what he designates as 
'achievement' words : 
"To 'see' is to succeed in a task - it is 
parallel to winning a race, as distinct from 
running in one. If Moore was puzzled by the 
elusiveness of 'mental acts'/ this is for the 
very good reason that he was looking for what is 
17 
not there to be found". 
Mind-Body dualism is categorically rejected by Ryle, 
for such a dualism makes the mind the private and 
unobservable and the body a mindless object. Ryle contends 
that human beings are unities. There is no impassable gulf 
between our bodily behaviours and mental intentions. By 
watching people's behaviours, we can successfully make out 
as to whether they are tired, interested/ hopeful or 
loving. Therefore/ the myth of essentially private, 
impenetrable mental worlds is impossible of being sustained 
if we can accept the dispositional analysis of human 
behaviour. 
It is only through language that we can and often do 
manage to distinguish between the so-called mental or 
physical events. The distinction is made or achieved purely 
through logical, syntactical and grammatical mechanisms or 
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manipulations. Such purely artificial mechanisms should not 
blind us to the essential unity of a human personality. 
"But the fact that we do so distinguish 
between the two sorts of events does not mean 
that humans are packaged in two water-tight 
compartments, the first dodily, material, and 
publically observable; the second interior, 
mental, and forever private. Once we appreciate 
the fact of the essential unity of human beings 
and the artificiality of the physical public/ 
mental-private distinction, says Ryle, we shall 
appreciate as well the origin and refutation of 
19 the materialist dualist dispute". 
III. THE FATALIST DILEMMA : 
Furthermore, Ryle argues that philosophical dilemmas 
also arise from misinterpreting some unproblematic and 
compatible proposition in such a way that it becomes a 
rival to the ordinary man's views on this matter. For 
example, such a dilemma is what, Ryle calls "Fatalist 
Dilemma". 
The fatalist argument is generated or incubated in 
this way : 
Last Sunday night, I coughed at 10 P.M., and went to 
bed by 10.30 P.M. It was, one does or may argue, true on 
Saturday, morning that in the coming night I will cought at 
one moment and go to bed at another. In point of fact, it 
was true thousands of years ago. Indeed, it was true from 
all eternity that I would cough and go to bed at two 
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particular points of time. Accordingly/ it must have been 
impossible for me not to have coughed by 10 P.M. last 
20 Sunday night and gone to bed by 10.30 P.M. 
From this follows the generalisation that whatever 
anyone does; anywhere, anyhow, any time in any way had got 
to be done and could not have been averted in whatsoever 
circumstances despite all-out efforts on our part. For, it 
was true from eternity that it was going to happen and 
therefore it just could not have happened. Therefore, 
anything that we do or undertake is bound to be done or 
undertaken as per the inexorable vvisdom and inscrutible 
mystery of the cosmic situation. 
Ryle argues that the Fatalist Dilemma is a product 
of misinterpretation of the dictum 'whatever is, was to 
be'. For example, no philosophical dilemma arises if we 
interpret this dictum viz. "that for everything that 
happen's, if anyone had at any previous time made the guess 
that it v/ould happen, his guess would have turned out 
.^. 21 correct . 
Such an interpretation is not against the common 
man's belief that he sometimes or often does exercize some 
control over his actions. The philosophical problem arises 
when the dictum is interpreted in such a way that it seems 
to run parallel to common-man's belief. Such a parallel 
interpretation of the dictum is worked out in such a way as 
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if those propositions describing what takes placle had been 
written down in some book of destiny, before the events 
described actually did take place. Thus we think that 'a 
things' actually taking place is, so to speak, merely the 
turning up of a passage that has for all time been 
written". 
The philosophical trouble is further complicated if 
it is assumed that somebody such as God has actually 
written the Book of Destiny. Such a suggestion is the basis 
for theological version of Fatalism known as the doctrine 
of predestination. The theological version of Fatalism does 
not bother Ryle, for he thinks it to be devoid of any 
22 
evidence and most likely just false. 
However he is concerned in bringing out the origin 
of the fatalist-misinterpretation. Ryle thinks that it 
originates from a widely prevalent category-mistake. Ryle 
points out that when the dictum 'whatever is, was to be' , 
is interpreted in such terms as "that for everything that 
happen's, if anyone had at any previous time made the 
guess that it would happen, his guess would have turned out 
correct', we are mistaking the nature of the term correct. 
Traditionally philosophers thought that the use of the term 
'correct' here indicates some property , just as adjectives 
like 'white' and 'sweet' do in any set of respective 
propositions. Now if the adjective 'correct' is prefixed or 
suffixed to a proposition, it is thought that it labels or 
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qualifies a proposition which is a logical entity that 
exists or subsists eternally and can be thought of or 
expressed in sentences at a particular period of time. From 
this supposition, it has not been very difficult for 
philosophers to positing the existence of propositions 
correctly describing the states of affairs even before the 
events taking place. 
Ryle confines himself to an analysis of the 
fatalists' use of the term 'correct'. The term 'correct' is 
not a label of some property. It is merely an obituary and 
valedictory epithet. It does not describe anything. It is 
more like a conferment of an award to a 'sentence'. The 
proposition "oxygen helps in the burning of fire" does not 
function like the proposition, 'Sugar is white and sweet'. 
The first proposition is a guess or a hypothesis whereas 
the second proposition is a description of a certain 
property. A proposition about the future turns out to be 
correct or incorrect only after the event described in the 
proposition has taken place, just as a guess is fulfilled 
or unfulfilled only after the event guessed has taken 
place. Propositions about the future are not correct or 
incorrect in anticipation of events taking place, just as 
promises, wishes, dreams, and guesses etc., are not 
fulfilled or unfulfilled without the necessary efforts 
undertaken. If we realise that the dictum "whatever is, was 
to be", pertains to propositions about the future which may 
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or may not turn out to be correct in course of time/ its 
fatalist nuances will be immediately dissolved into 
nothingness. 
Ryle points out that the fatalist dilemma may also 
arise from assuming 'correct' and 'incorrect' as synonymous 
with 'true' and 'false'. For example/ usually speaking the 
titles 'true' and 'false' are used as verdicts pronounced 
upon carefully formulated propositions about past or 
present events. On the other hand, 'correct' and 
'incorrect' are verdicts applied to guesses or predictions 
when they are finally declared as fulfilled or unfulfilled. 
Now if we assimilate 'correct' and 'incorrect' to 'true' 
and 'false'/ we will be according guesses or predictions 
the status of established statements about past events. 
Such an assimilation might lead us to interpreting "what 
iS/ was to be "/ not as a conditional prediction which 
finally turned out to be correct/ but as a proposition 
about the future which was accurate from the moment of its 
formulation. 
The fatalist does not realise that it is events 
which make propositions true and not propositions which 
make events come true. Such a failure is a vital source of 
his misinterpretation. The fatalist does not make this 
mistake while analysing the propositions about past events. 
He misinterprets while analysing propositions pertaining to 
future events. 
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"A large part of the reason is that in 
thinking of a predecessor making its successor 
necessary we unwittingly assimilate the 
necessitation to causal necessitation. Gunfire 
makes windows rattle a few seconds later, but 
rattling windows do not make gunfire happen a 
few seconds earlier, even though they may be 
perfect evidence that gunfire did happen a few 
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second earlier". 
Ryle says that since we can and do argue from a 
proposition to an event, when, for example, we argue from 
"there is foot-print on the sand", to the fact that a foot 
must have trod on the piece of sand, we can be led into 
thinking that propositions can cause events. However, this 
piece of argument is merely drawing out entailment of one 
truth by another, of one true proposition by another. We 
are making use of logical necessity not causal necessity. 
The entailment of a proposition is not an event but another 
proposition. The fatalist is assimilating logical necessity 
to causal necessity. A fatalist is not merely claiming that 
events are practically inevitable but that they have the 
same inevitability as the conclusion of a valid syllogism 
which has true premises. 
"What happens is inevitable or doomed, and 
what makes it sound even worse, logically 
inevitable or logically doomed-somewhat as it 
is logically inevitable that the immediate 
successor of any even number is an odd number. 
So what does 'inevitable' mean ? An avalanche 
may be, for all practical purposes. 
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unavoidable. A mountainer in the direct path 
of an avalanche can himself do nothing to stop 
the avalanche or get himself out of its way, 
though a providential earthquake might 
conceivably divert the avalanche or a 
helicopter might conceivably lift him out of 
danger. His position is much worse/ but only 
much worse/ than that of a cyclist half a mile 
ahead of a lumbering steam-roller. It is 
extremely unlikely that the steam-roller will 
catch up with him at all, and even if it does 
so it is extremely likely that its driver will 
halt or that the cyclist himself wiLl move off 
in good time. But these differences between the 
plights of the mountaineer and the cyclist are 
differences of degree only. The avalunche is 
practically unavoidable, but it is not 
logically inevitable. Only conclusions can be 
logically inevitable, given the premises, and 
an avalaunche is not a conclusion. The fatalist 
doctrine, by contrast, is that everything is 
absolutely and logically inevitable in a way in 
which the avalauche is not absolutely or 
logically inevitable; that we are all 
absolutely and logically powerless where even 
the hapless mountaineer is only in a desperate 
plight and the cyclist is in no real danger at 
all; that everything is fettered by the Law of 
Contradiction to taking the course it does 
take, as odd numbers are bound to succeed even 
numbers. What sort of fetters are these purely 
27 logical fetters". 
Logical truths do necessarily imply the truth of 
other propositions. Today is Monday implies that tomarrow 
is Tuesday. It cannot be other way round. However one truth 
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can be made necessary by another truth but events 
themselves cannot be made necessary by truths. An avalauche 
can be inescapable for all practical purposes and the 
conclusion of an argument can be logically inescapable. 
However an avalauche cannot have and need not have the 
inescapability of the conclusion of an argument. The 
fatalist tries to invest events and happenings with the 
inescapability of the conclusion of a valid argument. Our 
familiarity with the practical inescapability of some 
things, like some avalanches, helps us to yield to the view 
that really everything that happens is inescapable, only 
not now in the way in which some avalanches are inescapable 
and others not, but in the way in which logical 
consequences are inescapable, given their premises. The 
fatalist has tried to characterize happenings by predicates 
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which are proper only to conclusions of arguments. 
There is a logical trickiness about the fatalist 
doctrine. For example, by appropriate traffic-planning and 
engineering, considerable number of accidents can be 
prevented. However, a list of particular accidents averted 
can never be prepared. It can be argued that accidents of 
such and such kinds which used to be frequent are now rare. 
However, it cannot be said that yesterday's collision 
between this loaded truck and that passenger bus at this 
corner was, fortunately, averted. We can never point to or 
name a particular happening and say of it 'this happening 
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was averted' . Ryle says that this is a logical truism. 
However, this logical truism seems to commit us to saying 
"No happening can be everted" and therefore it is no good 
trying to ensure or prevent anything happening. So when we 
try to say that somethings that happened could have been 
prevented/ we seem to be in a queer logical fix. Ryle 
points out that averted fatalities are not fatalities at 
all. We cannot/ in logic/ say of any designated fatality 
that it was averted and this sounds like sayig that it is 
29 logically impossible to avert any fatalities. 
SO/ though we are right to say that some sorts of 
accidents can be prevented/ yet we cannot put this by 
saying that this designated accident might have been 
prevented from occurring not because it was of an 
unpreventable sort, but because neither 'preventable' nor 
'unpreventable' can be epithets of designated occurrences, 
any more than 'exists' or 'does not exist' can be 
predicated of designated things or persons. 
Thus Ryle thinks that the fatalist dilemma is born 
out of category-mistake as well as from confusing logical 
necessity with causal necessity, which confusion may again 
be said to be a 'category-mistake.. 
Thus Ryle's treatment of philosophical disagreement 
is diametrically opposite to the conventional approach. 
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The conventional philosopher or metaphysician would take 
sides in a philosophical controversy. He would offer 
reasons for and against in any philosophical deadlock. 
Ryle like other linguistic analysts does not accept this 
method of doing philosophy or treating a specific 
philosophical disagreement. 
Kyle's method of treating a philosophical 
disagreement is to bring out thelogic of key philosophical 
discourse in any philosophical dispute. By bringing out 
thelogic or area of use of a philosophical term- 'We clarify 
the category-confusion because of which a philosophical 
probleir or disagreement does arise/ to begin with. Thus 
when we understand the origin or rise of a philosophical 
disagreement/ our quest for "thrashing out a solution dies 
down and thus a philosophical disagreement is dissolved^so 
to say. 
There is no solution of a philosophical disagreement 
as such. It cannot happen that one day metaphysical 
philosophers will finally succeed in proving the truth of 
either idealism or materialism. It cannot happen that one 
fine morning theologians will finally succeed in proving 
the existence of God or disbelievers will conclusively 
demonstrate the absence of God from the cosmic sciieme of 
thi'ngs. Ryle would say that instead of searching for 
so-called final s^pcl\i€i6'iii'txjffi;j,|^ losophical disagreements/ 
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we must concentrate on the identification of the logical 
jurisdiction of key philosophical terms in a particular 
dispute. 
For example, when we discuss the question of the 
existence of God, we are treating 'God' on the same 
logical/ linguistic, syntactical and grammatical planes as 
we do treat other words such as 'pen', 'book', 'chair', 
'table' etc. We do not realise that the word 'God' belongs 
to a different logical area or jurisdiction. Therefore, 
all God-statements pertaining to or arguing for such 
theories as monotheism or pantheism etc., are products of 
the confusion of the logical status of the word 'God'. 
Similarly, while arguing for idealism or Materialism, we 
must realise that the logic of 'Mind' and 'Matter' cannot 
be confused with such words as 'Knowing', 'understanding', 
'Imagining' or 'diamond', 'steel', 'copper' etc. 'Mind' 
and 'Matter' may at best be deemed to be logical 
constructions. After all, 'Matter' is not logically at par 
with 'diamond' or 'Steel' or 'Copper' etc. Nevertheless, 
when a materialist says that Matter is the ultimate stuff 
of reality, the statement is logically at par with . 
such a statement as "Diamond is the hardest of all 
metals". Thus, Ryle might say that two sides of a typical 
philosophical disagreement are functions of two category 
confusions at one and the same time. 
To conclude, Ryle's analysis of the Mind-Body 
problem and Fatalist Dilemma shows that he regards 
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philosophical problems and disagreements as born out of 
category-confusions or category-mistakes. Such problems as 
the existence of God, freedom of the will, nature of time 
etc. and many more could/ according to Rylean analysis, be 
shown to be born out of category-mistakes. Therefore, 
philosophical disagreement, in general, may be said to be 
born out of conjoining logically incompatible propositions 
or proposition-factors. 
Therefore, we need not develop philosophical 
theories based on category-mistakes. Such theories as try 
to explain the mind-body relationship viz. interactionism, 
psycho-physical parallelism, 'pre-established harmony', 
etc., may be said to be category-confusions worse 
confounded. We should not try to develop these 
pseudo-theories in response to pseudo-problems. Theories 
pertaining to God such as pantheism, monotheism. Deism, 
polytheism etc., too should not be taken as serious points 
of departure in response to the so-called 'God-problem'. 
Such theories can be shown to be products of category-
confusions. God-talk too can be shown to be of a different 
logical category or plane in comparison to other types of 
discourse. 
What is important is to grasp the 'category-logic' 
of concepts such as Mind, God, Time, Space, Matter etc., 
and thus avoid conjoining logically incompatible 
proposition-factors. Otherwise, we shall go on, 
pointlessly, taking sides in philosophy. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
CRITICAL EVALUATION 
Gilbert Ryle has played a key role in creatively 
applying the method of linguistic analysis to a host of 
philosophical problems. He worked out detailed analysis of 
concepts and expressions that seemed to him to be 
misleading and confusing. His life-long interest was in 
mapping the logical geography of concepts. He shared with 
Wittgenstein the view that philosophy has the function of 
liberating us from confusions and puzzlements. In his 
numerous writings Ryle has repeatedly underscored that 
conceptual confusions arise out of our confusing of Grammar 
with logic. While doing philosophy/ grammatical 
similarities and differences are confused with logical 
similarities and differences. Philosophical problems are 
born out of similar grammatical treatment of logically 
different categories. The job of philosophy is to remove 
conceptual roadblocks or liberate us from conceptual 
traffic-jams/ so to say. 
One of the most significant contributions made by 
Ryle in contemporary philosophy was his masterly critique 
of Cartesian dualism. Although the doctrine of Mind-Body 
dualism formulated by Descartes in 17th century had 
variously been attacked by subsequent philosophers, yet 
till Mid 20th century it had retained its central thesis. 
Ryle's book 'Concept of Mind' plausibly made a strong case 
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against Cartesian thesis and contemporaneously there are 
few philosophers who can afford to argue for the validity 
of Cartesian thesis. 
Kyle's 'Concept of Mind' is a sustained effort to 
map the logical geography of the words we employ in our 
language to describe mental activity. Ryle contends that 
"Descartes Myth" has been the source of confusion in 
philosophy for centuries. Such confusion can be eliminated 
by carefully examining the ways in which we actually use 
mentalistic terms in our language. The day-to-day use of 
mentalistic terms does not necessarily indicate any kind of 
dualism between mind and body. The so-called two substances 
of Cartesian ontology of mind and body are not 
diametrically opposite to each other, as argued by 
Descartes. It is the logic of mentalistic terms that is 
quite different from the logic of physicalistic terms. The 
so-called Mind-Body problem is born out of an assimilation 
of the logic of mentalistic terms to the logic of 
physicalistic terms. 
Ryle tries to bring out this confusion by giving 
various examples. His contention is that there is a special 
kind of confusion which can be illustrated by that of 
taking team spirit as an element in a game as being on 
equal footing with serving or receiving/ of taking a 
division as a military formation as being on equal footing 
with its component regiments, of taking oxford university 
as an institution as being on equal footing with its 
component colleges. Ryle then goes on to claim that 
traditional Cartesian dualism treats the mind as an entity 
on equal footing with the body and mental activities as 
being on equal footing with bodily activities; and that 
this is a confusion of the same kind as those in the three 
illustrative cases. 
Such a misconception Ryle calls the dogma of the 
ghost in the machine. He attempts to show its falsity in a 
series of chapters on the main aspects of mental life, in 
which the arguments fall into two main classes. On the one 
hand he tries to show that the dogma of the ghost in the 
machine fails in its explanatory task and is logically 
incoherent, leading to such logical evils as vicious 
infinite regresses. On the other hand, he tries to show 
that a satisfactory positive account of mental phenomena 
can be given, without invoking the ghost, in terms of such 
things as style of performance, dispositions to certain 
characteristic performances, and acquired skills. Thus, if 
a person does a physical action while thinking about what 
he is doing, we must take it not that ghost discursively 
thinks and the bodily machine moves but that the person 
performs bodily in an appropriate way, while being disposed 
to perform other actions if the occasion arises. 
In his Tarner Lectures, subsequently published as 
'Dilemmas', it is claimed that many philosophical problems. 
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if not all/ immediately present themselves in the form of 
dilemmas : we find ourselves holding, without the 
possibility of sincere repudiation, two or more opinions 
which seem to be incompatible. For example, we think, we 
often choose res'ponsibly what to do and simultaneously 
think that we are what we are through our natural endowment 
as modified by environment. This is the famous problem of 
free-will vs. determinism and presents a typical 
philosophical dilemma. Such dilemmas must be overcome by 
showing that the apparent conflict is a consequence of 
conceptual confusions rather than making a choice, this way 
or that way. 
However, Ryle's treatment of the Mind-Body problem 
or Fatalist Dilemma suffers from several limitations. A 
brief overview of the same may be presented as follows : 
With regard to Mind-Body problem Ryle's argument is 
not merely that previous philosophers have made a number of 
particular mistakes in the characterization of particular 
points of ordinary usages and ways of thought; they have 
been wrong in detail because they have been wrong in 
principle. Ryle's polemic is launched against Cartesianism 
or what he calls the official doctrine and the 
para-mechanical hypothesis. However, the precise historical 
identification and even more the historical order of 
responsibility for the doctrine cannot be fixed. 
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The first cardinal mistake pervading the Rylean 
analysis is just this assumption that the origin of the 
conception of the mind as a ghost within a machine is of 
purely historical and of no philosophical interest. An 
inquiry into the origins of the conception reveals that for 
from being imposed on the plain man by philosophical 
theorists of 17th century, the myth of the mind as a ghost 
within the body is one of the most primitive and natural of 
all the innumerable myths which are deeply imbedded in the 
vocabulary and structure of our languages. The two 
substance conception of persons is the natural vernacular 
mode of description and it has developed independently of 
the attempts of Plato and of Christian theoriests or 17th 
century rationalists who tried to systematise it as a self-
conscious doctrine. Ryle throughout represents philosophers 
as corrupting the literal innocence of common sense speech 
with alien metaphors. In this he not only greatly 
exaggerates the influence of philosophers on the forms of 
common speech, but neglects the facts, or rather the 
necessity, that the forms of common speech and its modes of 
description should be permeated with such metaphors, most 
of which can ultimately be traced back to underlying myths 
and imaginative pictures. Descartes was himself suspicious 
of metaphors and of graphic representations in language. 
It is characteristically a philosophers complaint that we 
normally describe mental processes and conditions in terms 
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which have been transferred from an original use of 
application to physical objects. As transferred terms .are 
by defination metaphors, most pyshcological descriptions 
may therefore be said to be ultimately metaphorical. How 
otherwise can language be developed. 
t 
Thus Ryle is attacking not a philosophical theory of 
mind/ but a universal feature of ordinary language itself-
namely/ that most of its forms of description have been and 
are being evolved by the constant transfer of terms from 
application in one kind of context to application in 
another/ and in particular by the transfer of what were 
originally physical descriptions. Thus Rylean's treatment 
of Mind-Body conflict confuses a general feature of common 
language with a particular metaphysical theory. 
However/ there is another important consideration to 
be taken note of while examining Ryle's notion of category-
mistake. Ryle emphasizes that one cannot tell by the 
grammar of a sentence whether a category mistake has been 
committed/ since such a mistake may be committed even 
though the language in which it is expressed is 
grammatically correct. By what criterion/ then/ can one 
tell ? The test/ in Ryle's view/ seene to be whether the 
proposition in question (assuming that it is grammatically 
correct/ employs conventional vocabulary/ and so on) is 
absurd. For a category-mistake is said to have been 
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committed when one conjoins proposition-factors of 
incompatible types; and we have seen that "to say that a 
given proposition-factor' is of a certain category or type, 
is to say that its expression could complete certain 
sentence frames without absurdity". If so/ then one cannot 
first claim that a category-mistake has been committed and 
then conclude that a certain proposition is absurd; rather/ 
one must first show that the proposition in question is 
absurd. 
In the example of the visitor to the university/ who 
surveys the buildings and grounds and then asks where the 
university is, the absurdity is clear. But is it equally 
clear that the statement that the mind is an immaterial 
substance in which private events take place is absurd? 
Obviously, to many people it is not. Indeed, if Ryle is 
correct that this doctrine is prevalent among many 
theorists and laymen and that "most philosophers, 
psychologists and religious teachers subscribe, with minor 
reservations, to its main articles", then it may even be 
that it is not abusrd to most people. If so, then the 
accusation that this view commits a category-mistake looks 
dubious. 
It might be replied - unlike in the example of the 
university - that the requirement here is only that the 
doctrine appear absurd to a certain group of persons, say, 
linguistic philosophers. But then we must ask why their 
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opinion should be privileged over the opinions of many 
others - including other philosophers who may be followers 
of Descartes, theologians who believe that the immaterial-
substance theory is dictated by the tenets of their 
theology/ and many ordinary people for whom the belief is 
an integral part of their religious convictions. It is 
possible, of course, that after reading Ryle these people 
would agree that their beliefs are absurd and promptly 
relinguish them. But even granting that not all absurdities 
are readily apparent and that they often require 
painstaking argument for their disclosure, it would be 
incautious to expect large scale conversions to result from 
reflection upon ryle's arguments. Not even all philosophers 
who are equally familiar with the issues are prepared to 
endorse his assessment; it seems even less likely that 
those ordinary people for whom the belief is interwoven 
with their most cherished convictions would do so either. 
This points up a serious difficulty for Ryle's line 
of attack. For if an appeal to absurdity is to be the 
criterion for identifying category mistakes, and thereby 
for determining what is meaningful, then careful 
specification of the persons to whom something must seem 
absurd in order to qualify as a category mistake must be 
made and defended. If this is not the criterion then we 
must ask what is. Once we exclude purely formal features of 
sentences and range beyond simple cases like that of the 
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visitor to the university/ we are at a loss for guidelines. 
And it is at just those times that we encounter the 
philosophically interesting and controversial problems. 
Thirdly/ Ryle does not discuss the most common form 
of fatalism called causal fatalism. The claim of causal 
fatalism is not that there exist in some timeless logical 
realm true propositions about future events which somehow 
necessitate those events. The thesis of causal fatalism is 
that there exists in our ordinary world prior to any and 
every future event the fully determining cause of those 
events. A causal fatalist may believe that his sitting down 
to launch tomorrow will be the result of a causal chain 
already in motion now. In that case his sitting down to 
launch tomorrow is fully determinate. It is the inevitable 
result of the anticedent links in the causal chain leading 
upto this event. Ryle does not treat causal fatalism. He 
has just tried to analyse the logical version of the 
fatalist dilemma. Thus Ryles treatment of the Fatalist 
Dilemma does not take all its versions and formulations 
into consideration. 
Ryle's view of philosophy as mapping the logical 
geography of concepts is also questionable for it is 
excessively narrow and exclusivistic. One could question 
this view of the fundamental nature of philosophy by 
arguing, for example, that one of the enduring glories of 
philosophy is that it has been the source of so many new 
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areas of enquiry; such as natural science/ theology/ 
economics/ political science/ psychology and sociology etc. 
It is only because philosophers have engaged in tasks other 
than just pure analysis of existing usages/ and have formed 
theories of their own from basic empirical data that is 
available to everyone or from more sophisticated data 
gained as a result of a more than amateur acquaintance with 
some area of knowledge, that they have formed the theories 
which became the basis of these new areas of enquiry. That 
iS/ one fairly persistent view of philosophy has seen its 
basic task as asking fundamental questions about areas 
where such fundamental questions have not been asked 
before. 
Philosophy may show itself not so much in the 
discovery of new answers as in the discovery of new 
questions. It may influence its age not by solving its 
problems but by opening its eyes to previously unconsidered 
problems. So the new ideas released by philosophy may be 
those which give a new direction to enquiry/ often 
amounting to a new method of thinking. 
Furthermore/ Ryle's treatment of philosophical 
disagreement may be deemed acceptable within the over-all 
linguistic explanation of philosophy. However/ the 
phenomenon of philosophical disagreement cannot be treated 
or explained only by recourse of Linguistic Analysis. There 
are other perspectives on philosophy which give entirely 
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different explanations of the phenomenon of philosophical 
disagreement. For example/ the existentialist and the 
sociological approaches to philosophy do provide their own 
explanations of philosophical disagreement. 
The problems of philosophy, according to 
existentialists, are diametrically opposite to scientific 
or mathematical/ or logical questions. Science, for 
example/ is concerned with the manipulation of physical 
objects and data confirming or arriving at its results 
through experimental verification. Philosophical questions 
have no definite answers. Our engagement with philosophical 
problems results into profound perplexity and bafflement. 
Scientific questions demand total concentration in case we 
want to resolve them. However/ philosophical questions 
pertaining to Free-will/ Evil and God etc./ engage us to 
our foundations and our whole mode of life is at stake 
while trying to resolve them, this way or that way. Our 
deepest drives/ desires/ attitudes/ hopes/ fears/ 
aspirations; in fact/ the very mode of existence is 
drastically altered while deciding a philosophical issue. 
Our commitment entails radical corresponding change in our 
life-style. As philosophical questions cannot be resolved 
through mathematical demonstration or experimental 
verification/ their resolution unavoidably entails faith/ 
commitment/ dlecision and finally an inescapable ring of 
doubt. 
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Various philosophical alternatives offer choices and 
we have to choose any one of the alternatives in keeping 
with our own inner lights. Whether to believe in God or 
not/ become a Muslim or a buddhist/ deem man free or 
determined/ choose between a supposed good and supposed 
evil etc./ are matters to be decided in consultation with 
the depths of our subjectivity or conscience . Even the 
perennial philosophical positions viz. Monism/ Dualism, 
Rationalism/ Hedonism/ Materialism/ Idealism/ etc, are/ at 
bottom/ rationally laboured responses to the eternal 
questions pertaining to the origin/ status and destiny of 
man in the cosmic scheme of things. 
Thus the existentialist approach views philosophy as 
originating from the mystery of human existence and not 
arising out of category-mistakes or conceptual-confusions 
as held by Gilbert Ryle. As against Rylean explanation of 
philosophical disagreement/ existentialist approach to 
philosophy couregously accepts philosophical disagreement 
or plurality of philosophical responses. The job of 
philosophy is not to explain philosophical disagreement but 
to illuminate the nature of multiple choices and 
alternatives that confront man in his practical life. The 
interactable controversies of philosophy cannot be 
explained through Linguistic analysis but by recourse to 
arriving at a decision amongst unavoidable multiple 
choices. There cannot be a universality applicable formula 
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or technique of resolving a philosophical disagreement. 
Every person will have to resolve a philosophical dilemma 
according to his ovm inner lights. 
Similarly/ the superscientific conception of 
philosophy is outrightly rejected by the sociological 
approach to philosophy. It refuses to accept philosophy as 
an exploration of transcendental ontological facts. To that 
extent/ it is in agreement with the analytical approach 
championed by Wittgenstein and Ryle. However/ the 
sociological approach to philosophy advances an altogether 
different explanation of philosophical disagreement. It 
does not treat a philosopher as a wholly deconditioned or 
detached explorer of 'Truth-in-Itself' but a culturally 
conditioned and ethnocentrically oriented person. 
Philosophy is a function of the socio-cultural setting in 
which it originates and operates. Metaphysical speculation 
or philosophical argumentation is not inspired by a 
disinterested search for truth but by political ideology, 
religious world-view and technological situation of a 
particular society at a particular point of historical 
evolution. 
Therefore/ philosophical disagreement is a product 
of differing cultural and historical field situations. A 
philosophical theory emerges from the pre-philosophical 
group conceptual field. Philosophical contentions and 
arguments are pre-philosophically directed/ if not 
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determined. The philosophical disagreement within a 
particular cultural group can be traced to differing 
psychological specificities or individual differences 
amongst a group of philosophers representing a particular 
•world-view-cum-value-system'. 
The Marxian view of philosophy is one of the 
significant versions of the sociological approach to 
philosophy. For Marx, philosophy is a part of the 
ideological justification of a particular social system 
based on an economic structure or arrangement. Human 
history is a struggle between classes. It is a perennial 
struggle between ruling and ruled classes. The governing 
ideas or controlling values of any age are the ideas and 
values of the ruling class. The governing class justifies 
the existing economic structure or the status quo by 
offering an ideological justification for the same. On the 
other hand, the exploited people challenge the existing 
economic arrangement by working out an alternative set of 
ideas. This is not a controversy to be settled by logical 
argumentation. It is a battle for the appropriation of the 
means and modes of production and can be settled only by 
recourse to violent action. 
Thus we find that philosophical disputes or 
disagreements are culturally, politically and economically 
inspired controversies and not necessarily motivated by a 
disinterested search for truth. Gilbert Ryle's treatment of 
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philosophical disagreement as arising out of conceptual 
confusions does not tell the whole story. It iS/ at best/ a 
partial explanation of the phenomenon of philosophical 
disagreement. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The history of philosophy reveals that there has 
been continuous disagrement on various philosophical 
theses. In fact, the phenomenon of philosophical 
disagreement has deeply puzzcled the proponents as well as 
the opponents of philosophy. Each civilization has 
generated its own peculiar philosophical controversies. 
Philosophy has bristled with interminable disagreements 
throughout the ages. It has never been possible for all 
philosophers to agree on a set of philosophical 
conclusions. Furthermore, the disagreements have been 
perennially figuring in ancient, medieval and modern ages. 
The problems are still under discussion and will continue 
to be debated during centuries to come. 
The ontological, cosmological and axiological 
standpoints of philosophers have offered bewildering 
variety and complexity, apart from being diametrically 
opposite to one another. For example, while Heraclitus 
speculated that everything is in a constant flux, motion and 
change; Parmenides argued that from being only being can 
become something else and whatever is always has been and 
always will be and that everything remains what it is. 
Sophists argued for ethical subjectivism and relativism 
whereas Plato advocated forms to be objective and absolute. 
Aristotle criticised Plato for maintaining that universal 
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forms transcend their particular instances in the physical 
universe. In 17th century Descartes tried to break 
completely with Christian Scholasticism. Locke refuted the 
doctrine of innate ideas advanced by Descartes. Berkeley 
rejected the Lockean contention that primary qualities are 
independent of mind. Hume repudiated Berkeley's notion of 
soul-substance. Kant criticised Hume for drawing radical 
skeptical conclusions. Hegel differed with Kant for his 
epistemological approach to philosophy and instead 
advocated his dialectical method of doing philosophy. In 
19th century Schopenhaur, Kierkiegaard, Karl MarX/ and 
Nietzsche/ rejected the entire metaphysical, axiological 
epistemological package of ancient, medieval and modern 
philosophers. 
Thus, as a matter of fact, we have various 
ontological, cosmological and epistemological doctrines. In 
fact, every philosophical position has a counter-position. 
We have materialists contesting the standpoint of 
idealists, pluralists opposing monists, atheists 
criticising theists, Teleologists, rejecting mechanists, 
Pragmatists differing with existentialists, intuitionists 
repudiating empiricists and humanists contradicting 
fundamentalists etc. In addition, we have Pythogoreans, 
Buddhists, Platonists, Aristotlelians, Thomists, Vedantins, 
Cartesians etc. celebrating and standing for philosophical 
outlooks or religious world-views of the founders of these 
schools. 
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The phenomenon of philosophical disagreement was 
highlighted owing to the increasing standardization of 
scientific results during the last five hundred years. 
While natural sciences have registered solid progress in 
their fields of enquiry/ metaphysical philosophers have 
been proliferating disagreements and controversies, 
vnienever great metaphysicians have tried to solve 
philosophical problems/ they have ended up generating 
additional contradictions/ antinomies and paradoxes. Right 
from ancient Greeks upto twentieth-century Neo-Hegelians/ 
no philosophical agreement has ever been worked-out and it 
does not seem that further philosophical enquiry will 
arrive at any major consensus. 
Philosophical disagreements are not like scientific 
or mathematical disagreements. Rival scientific hypotheses 
can be subjected to well-known methods of observation, 
induction, deduction and verification and thus disputes can 
be resolved. New factual findings can confirm or disconfirm 
particular scientific hypothesis. Often a new hypothesis 
emerges in the light of relevent experiments carried out. A 
mathematical dispute can also be resolved by recourse to 
logical deduction. However, a philosophical dispute is not 
amenable to scientific verification or logical deduction. 
Philosophical contentions are neither proved nor disproved; 
neither confirmed nor disconfirmed.No philosophical dispute 
is settled once for all. Every philosophical thesis or 
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statement is perennially debatable. Philosophical 
statements sound more like enigmas and riddles rather than 
theories. In view of the same^ not a single metaphysical 
contention has been finally resolved so far* despite the 
fact that men of exceptional genius have struggled very 
hard at their resolution. 
In view of the above methodological field-situation 
linguistic analysts such as Gilbert Ryle, offer us a way 
out. They suggest that philosophical problems are rooted in 
logic, language, grammar and syntax etc. Therefore, it is 
essential that we carry out a logical, linguistic, 
grammatical and syntactical analysis of philosophical 
discourse. We shall discover, they maintain, that 
philosophical problems will be dissolved by recourse to 
such an analysis. For Gilbert Ryle, philosophy is a 
function of our constantly committing category-mistakes. We 
confuse the logical status or role of various categories in 
vogue in our day-to day language. Then we give them similar 
treatment in our writings, speeches and arguments. Thus 
philosophical problems crop up. These philosophical 
problems will disappear if we can grasp or appreciate the 
category-confusions or category-mistakes that originate and 
sustain them, to begin with. In this way, all philosophical 
disagreements will be dissolved or philosophical 
controversies will stop bothering us any further. 
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Thus, for Ryle the job of philosophy is to 
undertake analysis leading to what may be called category 
clarification or category-rectification as against the 
category-confusion or category-mistake which lead to 
philosophical problems and consequent philosophical 
disagreements. 
There is an element of truth in this Rylean account 
of philosophy. Philosophical problems are intimately linked 
to language. However/ whether they originate from language 
or category confusions and mistakes is a moot point. 
Language cannot be deemed to be enjoying an absolute and 
i^nqualified licence in legislating all kinds of 
philosophies, world-views and ideologies for us. Language, 
after all, is a human enterprise or institution. Philosophy 
is a human enterprise as well. Language can qualify 
philosophy as much as philosophy can qualify language. 
However, it does not mean that language originates or 
generates philosophy or philosophy originates or generates 
language. Philosophy is a highly controversial area of 
human endeavour. However, it is highly inadequate and 
unhelpful to trace all philosophical problems and 
disagreements to category-confusions. Philosophical 
problems and disagreements originate from man. Language can 
illuminatle or misleald us. However, that does not mean 
that workings or mishandling? of language are responsible 
for the rise and fall of philosophy. 
100 
However/ the central question pertaining to 
Linguistic Analysis in general and in this dissertation 
specifically with regard to Gilbert Ryle's view of 
philosophy as an activity or method of correcting the 
misunderstandings and consequent mishandlings of ordinary 
language leading to false or untenable metaphysical 
beliefs; is its own status. Obviously, it is not a 
descriptive thesis giving an overview as to how the actual 
historical development of philosophy has taken place or how 
philosophy has been carried out by such philosophers as 
Parmenids, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel etc. Ryle's view of or 
assignment to philosophy would not be even recognisable to 
such distinguished 17th century philosophers as Descartes, 
Spinoza and Leibniz who thought that the most important 
business of philosophy was to work out some definite first 
principles from which one could deduce a whole system of 
theorems or conclusions pertaining to many areas of 
knowledge. Even empiricists would have defined philosophy 
as an examination of the faculties of mind, especially its 
powers of knowing and perceiving; with a view to 
determining the scope and limits of our own understanding. 
Therefore, it is safe to persume that the method of 
Linguistic Analysis views the role of philosophy in 
an altogether different light. It is not entirely a method 
of doing philosophy. It is a new framework for philosophy 
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as well as a new perspective on philosophical problems. 
Thus Rylean view of the role of philosophy is also 
reconunendatory. It is a normative thesis. This thesis does 
not describe as to how philosophy has historically been 
done for centuries across continents and civilisations. It 
suggests that no matter what philosophers have been doing 
for centuries, now they ought to carry out their pursuits 
in this way. 
Philosophy is an all-inclusive intellectual 
endeavour. It has accomodated this highly normative thesis 
regarding itself. However, linguistic analysis leading to 
category-clarification and dissolution of philosophical 
disagreements cannot be deemed to be the sole task or 
purpose of philosophy. A critical examination of 
world-views and ideologies, an illumination of the 
possibilities and limitations of human existence and an 
exploration of new intellectual vistas etc, can be some of 
the more significant and relevant projects to be undertaken 
by philosophy. 
Every age has its own fanaticisms and fundamen-
talisms. Every age is psychologically attuned to the 
suggestion to be the wisest of all ages and to have been 
vouchsafed by destiny with final verities. Atomistic 
Analysis practised by Russell, Moore and early 
Wittgenstein, Positivistic attack launched by Schilick, 
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Carnap/ Wasimann and Ayer, Linguistic Analysis carried out 
by later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Wisdom/ Austin and others, 
etc. are surely new perspectives on philosophical problems. 
But it cannot be said that these perspectives are final or 
for that matter sacrosanct. These perspectives have emerged 
in response to the great methodological sophistication and 
standardisation achieved by western man in our century. The 
empiricistic perspective championed by Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume culminating in Kantian Critical Philosophy was an 
equally powerful outlook on philosophical questions. There 
were finalistic overtones in Humean and Kantian accounts of 
philosophy. However, a reassessment of philosophy by 
twentieth century philosophical analysts opened up fresh 
avenues of looking at philosophical questions and 
responses. Similarly, new developments in decades to come 
will necessitate a fresh look at Philosophy and we might 
become richer by new methodological insights and 
metaphilosophical perspectives. 
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